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JNTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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The period during and since World War<II saw dramatic increases in
the activities of the central state in all advanced, private capitalist
countries. In Australia the trend was magnified by the Commonwealth
government's assumption of function formerly exercised by the State.
During the War the Commonwealth became the sole collector of income tax;
the Chifley Labor government after the War expanded social welfare functions
and initiated a substantial immigration program; some minor new welfare
programs eg pharmaceutical benefits, were undertaken during the 1950's,
but the 1960's saw the Commonwealth assume responsibility for aboriginal
welfare, increase its involvement in the provision of education and create
its own Department of Housing.
These increases in Commonwealth activities have entailed an expansion
of Australian Public Service CAPS)' employment. Between 1939 and 1970 APS
employment increased from 2.4% to 6.4% of the civilian workforce, total
government employment increased from 13.7% to 19.6%.~ There has been no
.marxist attempt to examine the development of APS employment since World
War 11, despite its significance to the Australian economy and the importance
of exploring the internal structure of the state. This thesis provides
a marxist analysis of some central aspects of APS employment, in an attempt
to throw some light on the marxist theory of the state and socialist strategy.
The rise (and fall) of the student movement since 1968 and the onset
of the deepest capitalist crisis since the 1930's has seen a renewal of
controversy over socialist strategy. A crucial aspect has been the debate
on the nature of the state. Why does the capitalist state serve the interests
of the bourgeoisie? What does the Leninist program of "smashing the state"
mean? These have been questions which have a decisive significance for the
political practice of socialists. The answers given by different currents,
notably the "Eurocommunists" and Leninist "ultraleft" in Australia, as well
-2-
.as Western Europe, have been quite divergent. 2 By examining the
internal structure of the state and state employment,some new perspectives
on these questions can be generated. Furthermore such an approach provides
a means for assessing the possible role of state employees within a
revolutionary strategy.
Ideally a study of state employment in Australia would be located
within the framework of the changing role 6f the state. Unfortunately there
is no marxist study (or any other) which could provide such a framework.
It is beyond the scope of this project to construct one. BY,concentrating
on a specific part of Australian state employment - clerical designations
in the APS - i.t is hoped that the effects of this deficiency can be
. . . d 3mInImIse .
The body of the thesis is divided into three parts: overview and
clarification of theoretical issues - chapter 1, 2 and 3; some developments
in the APS labour process since 1945 - chapters 4 and 5; public service
employee organisation, chapter 6.
Chapter 1 provides an outline of the empirical scope of the thesis
and a statistical overview of state employment in Australia.
Chapter 2 considers marxist theories which have a bearing on the
questions in hand. Therborn ' s 1978 essay I' Dictatorship of the Proletariat
and the Class character of the State Apparatus"which directly addresses the
central concerns of the thesi~ is examined. It is criticised for its
inadequate understanding of the distinction between state and civil society,
shared by many other .t·marxist t analyses, which leads to a replacement of
concepts of historical materialism by those of orthodox social science,
when the internal structure of the state is being analysed. The critique of
Therborri .. leads to the conclusion that the nature of class relations wld'Jin::
the state must be the basis for further analysis of the state!s internal
structure. These class relations are explored by taking up the debate
on the "new middle class", initiated by Pou1antzas. He maintains that
state employees are members of the new petty bourgeoisie rather than
proletarian, because they do not perform productive labour. The related
critiques of Poulantzas by Carchedi and Wright point out the inadequacy
of the productive/unproductive labour criterion and his contradictory use
of other criteria (political and ideological roles). Carchedi's own approach,
which identified workers, members of the new middle class and bourgeoisie
amongst' state emp Ioyees is adopted and applied to the classifications .: ;',. r.
structure of the APS.
Carchedi's analysis opens the way to considering the APS as a labour
process. Chapter 3 established some specific characteristics of the APS
labour process through an exposition and application of Edwards' theory of
internal labour markets.
Part 11 examines the recent history of class relations in the APS
on the basis of the approach elaborated in Part 1. Chapter 4 considers the
developments from 1945 to the late 1960's and their continuing relevance.
The main aspects are: the relationship between staff ceilings and economic
conditions (early 1950's); joint consultation (1945 to around 1955);
"scientific management" (1948 to the present); and the automation of the
public service (early 1960's to the present).
Chapter 5 is concerned with d~ve1opments since the late 1960's. The
implications of the present crisis and staff ceilings are discussed. The
majority of the chapter deals with work humanisation schemes, briefly
examining international trends and then considering the course of their
development in Australia. Th~ final part of the chapter considers different
matxist approaches to work and the role of behayioura1 science as an
Ldeo l ogy,
Chapter 6 is an assessment of Australian public service trade unions
in the cantext of socialist strategy, The evolution of the Administrative
and Clerical Officers' Association and Australian Public Service Association
is briefly outlined as a background to the activites of the two left
groupings inside them, The experiences of the groups are used to throw
light on the potential role of public servants in a socialist strategy.
The following analyses are premised on a number of definitions and
propositions of marxist theory. It is not possible to present all of the
arguments, which underlie and are entailed in these, here. 4 However, it
maybe worthwhile to clarify some concepts which are central to the thesis:
Class struggle occurs at two levels, as far as we are concerned. The
opposed objectives, for bourgeoisie and proletariat, of the struggle constitue
their material or class interests. Economic class struggle is over the
rate of surplus value (or the rate of appropriation of surplus labour -
see chapter 2 for this modification). The proleta!,iat has an interest in
decreasing the rate of surplus value, the bourgeoisie in increasing it.
Thus the management techniques discussed in part 11 are weapons in the class
struggle and the relations of production are constituted in the class struggle
Le conflict over the rate of surplus value includes conflict over the (0('
conditions of its appropriation. Political class struggle is over the
system of exploitation itself, the bourgeoisie has an interest in its
maintenance, the proletariat in its destruction. The state is the most
important consideration in political class struggle. The bourgeoisie seeks
to maintain its state power, the preservation of the existing system of
state apparatuses (or institutions) eg public service, education system,
army, courts, and to use it to preserve capitalism. The proletariat attempts
to seize state power by destroying the present system and constructing a
new one, appropriate to its own ends.
PART ONE ~ THEORETICAL ISSUES
CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF STATE EMPLOYMENT
The growth in state activities, during and since World War II,
has been the object of attention, not only for marxists but also public
:-,. ,
1",1 ..
administrators and orthodox social scientists. The focus for marxists has
generally been the accretion of functions to the state or the growth of
state expenditures. S The study of these phenomena are crucial for an
understanding of the role of the contemporary state in the reproduction of
capitalist relations of production and its significance in the economic
crisis. The analyses examine the impact of the state on the economy
without probing its internal structure, and place it in a position above
and external to "civil society". Such an approach has a long lineage
going back to the early Marx and can be justified if the over-riding
consideration is to achieve an understanding of state institutions as the
focus for political class struggle. And this must be the primary consideration
for marxists, looking towards the displacement of bourgeois by proletarian
class power. Yet, to the extent that state 'apparatuses' are social
institutions, their employees are the bearers of social relations in the
same way as the employees in capitalist enterprises. Not only do state
employees share the attributes of all 'citizens' in their relationship
with, say Parliament, the family and the media, they also participate in
similar social relations at work. The state/civil society distinction should
not be understood to exclude an analysis of the internal structure of the
state nor similarities. between state and other employees.
There has been a neglect by marxists of the capitalist state as
an employer and of the labour processes which characterise the state. To
that extent the political potential of state employees has largely gone
unassessed. A brief, but useful st~dy(examines recent developments in
~6-
6British public service employment. Its concerns are~ the size of the public
service workforce, its composition and union organization, managerialism
and the effects of public expenditure cuts. No siInilar investigations have
been undertaken in Australia from a marxist (or any other) perspective.
The following attempts to provide an overview of trends in Australian
state employment since the War,together with an examination of some of
the most important aspects of the labour process in the "core" state
institutions - Commonwealth government departments. This project entails
the elaboration of an explanation for the capitalist nature of the capitalist
state, which focuses on its internal dynamics, and forms the basis for
assessing the revolutionary potential of state employees.
The scope of this study has been limited to employment under the
Commonwealth Public Service Act for a number of reasons, the most fundamental
and sordid of which are lack of space and difficulty in obtaining infonnation.
The capitalist state in Australia is far from being monolithic. State power
into 7is parcellised' around 900 segments of local, State and Commonwealth government.
Of these, seven (the States and Commonwealth) exercise the most significant
aspects of state power - police, armed forces, judiciary, the majority of
social services and tax raising. The fragmentation of state institutions and
employment makes the collection of general information difficult. Statistical
information comes from diverse sources and is frequently incompatible. In
aggregate the States have always employed more people than the Commonwealth,
although the latter's share has been increasing. During the post-war period,
however, the Commonwealth has been the largest single government employer.
Moreover, since Federation, the Australian Public Service CAPS) has been
recognised as a very significant influence on public service conditions and
administrative techniques in Australia. Within the APS there is diversity
of employing authorities - around 200~ statutory bodies, with varying degrees
of autonomy in addition to the Public Service Board '(PSB)~ The conditions
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of employment of some of these are determined under the Public Service
,
Act (PSA) but,since 197o, (and the establishment of Telecom Australia
and Australia Post as Commissions),a majority of Commonwealth employees
have been outside the Act. Nevertheless, the conditions of the largest
group~about one-third of Commonwealth Public Servants, are determined under
9the PSA. Further, the provisions of the PSA are reflected in other acts
governing public service emp1oyment l O (eg compare PSA section 50 sub-
section 4t oTelecommunications Act, section 47 sub-section 3)and the
conditions in force under the PSA carry some moral authority for employing
authorities other than the Public Service Board, as well as forming the
basis for those in newly established authorities. A Dlrther narrowing of
focus has been the examination of the clerical designations, rather than
professional or "manual" ones, under the PSA, as these are the largest
categories of ~np1oymmlt. The unions which cover them, Administrative and
Clerical Officers' Association (ACOA) and Australian Public Service
Association (Fourth Division Officers) (APSA, FDO) are the largest unions
with a majority of members covered by the Act.
In order to put the following analyses of the internal structure
of the state into perspective, we have made use of But1in's figures on
·11
employment in Australia to show the major trends in state employment.
Graph 1 and Table 1 indicate that between the depression and 1975
there has been a monotonic increase in government employment, except for
1953. That year, staff ceilings imposed in the APS and economic restraint
imposed by the Commonwealth government, restricting the activities of the
State as well, took effect. These measures were part of the ruling class
offensive, initiated around 1947 and leading to the fall of the Chifley
Labor Government. 12 The downturn in government employment since 1975
bears similarities to the situation during the depression and the early
1950's, especially the forme~given the global crisis of accumulation,
rather than a localised attempt to increase productivity and exploitation
in the context of a booming world economy.
Graph 2 and Table 2 show a relatively constant share of government
in civilian employment since World War 11. Compared with the interwar
period, 12% ± 2%, government employment stabilised at a much higher level
from 1945, 19% ! less than 1%. Thus growth in state activity since the
war has not led to a more rapid expansion of government than private employment.
Both have grown at a compound rate of about 2-3% per annum. It should be
noted that, in 1953 government employment fell more than proportionately:
it constituted 25.4% of the fall but only 19.5% of civilian employment.
11
That is, far from everring jout the f Iuctuat ron, as Keynesi an policy allegedly
seeks to do, the government exacerbated it.
Graph 3 and Table 3 show a fairly constant share of Commonwealth, in
total government employment, since 1945 30%~ 2%, reflecting the initial
transfer of personnel for war oriented activities to the newly acquired
functions of the central government.
Table 4 provides a closer guide to the changes in Australian 'government
employment in question here, full-time clerical employment under the PSA
than previous tables do.The numbers in this category fell more than aggregate
government emp1oyment,during the early 1950's.
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25838
25828
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29483
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52809
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1974-75 and
1901 1338 13485 600 15423 14
1902 1340 13555 ,759 15654 17
1903 1330 13165 1349 15844 22
1904 1359 13228 1516 16103 26
1905 '1349 135~1 1411 16341 31
m06 '1372 1.\0f.6 1094 16532 38
11107 '1~89 14A74 876 16839 41
m08 1595 143,16 584 17125 43
19~3 '1710 1529J 582 17590 45
1910 1849 15650 594 18093 46
1911 2026 16245 522 18793 49
1912 2278 16813 476 19567 49
1913 2451 17425 673 20549 75
1914 2583 17757 685 21025 98
1915 2700 16998 1252 20950 321
1916 2678 16781 743 20202 1251
1917 2645 16516 720 19881 2150
1918 2613 16483 743 19839 2151
1919 2664 16694 781 20139 1533
1920 2798 17219 711 20728 274
1921 2894 17478 1252 21624 87
1922 3021 18026 1373 22420 78
1923 3064 18803 1158 23025 75
1924 3269 19009 1110 23388 70
1925' 3458 1950l) 1238 24196 64
1926 3580 19687 1215 24482 66
1927 3631 20222 1053 24906 64
1928 3721 20057 1584 25362 57
1929 3734 19893 2049 25676 59
1930 3563 19134 3078 25775 63
1931 3226 17750 4795 25771 57
1932 3120 17385 5602 26107 55
1933 3183 18311 5164 26658 63
1934 3365 19051 4515 26931 66
1935 3543 19833 4037 27413 73
1936 3566 20711 3350 27627 80
1937 3740 21220 3002 27962 89
1938 3845 22073 2509 28427 95
1939 3980 ' 22250 2736 28966 113
1940 4099 22149 2699 28947 536
1941 4461 21671 1467 27599 2156
1942 5217 20590 593 26400 4608
1943 5492 19776 315 25583 6955
1944 5382 20161 330 25873 7212
1945 5250 20665 397 26312 6691
1946 5290 21968 709 27967 4016
1947 5641 24159 923 30723 834
1948 5889 25228 645 31762 460
1949 6184 26102 502 32788 357
1950 6564 26725 60.8 33J97 336
1951 6783 27850 397 35036 395
1952 6876 28415 515 35800 599
1953 6722 27963 106!.' ,:l57f,4 642
1954 702:2 28400 747 36169 643
1955 7299 29131 522 36952 616
1956 7418 29922 581 37921 610
1957 7479 30147 806 38432 562
1958 7655 30397 1041 39093 487
1959 7840 30704 1112 39658 493
1960 7884 31638 981 40501 483
1961 8128 33591 1037 42754 461
1962 8291 35262 716 44269 478
1963 8484 35599 541 44624 493
1964 8676 36134 648 45456 518
1965 8884 37246 555 46685 547
1966 9435 37941 654 46030 666
1967 9655 38901 788 49344 773
1968 9971 39881, 785 50637 808
1969 10218 41005 751 51974 835
1970 10532 42611 715 53858 842
1971 10625 43799 827 55251 832
1972 10987 43637 1102 55726 811
1973 11329 44680 1002 57011 741
1974 11715 46009 953 58677 676
Note: Omltllng universilies, the provisional official estimates for
1975-76, Including RED and NEAT (an Inconsistency) are:
1975 12605 44500 2296 59401 692
1976 12462 45943 2476 60881 688
.,.10.,.
,!
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ITable3 CIvilian Employment By Levels or Government 1900-01 to 1973-74, .
Shares in Tolal
Years Common- Local Tolal (per cenl)
Ending wealth Stales Author- Govern- I Local('00) llies ment common.'30 June ('00) ('00) ('00) wealth States Author-Ities
1901 181 1024 131 1338 13.5 76.5 9.8
1902 172 1036 131 1340 12.8 77.3 9.8
1903 179 1025 126 1330 13.5 77.1 _9.5
. 1904 173 1058 129 1359 12.7 77.9 9.5
1905 174 1044 130 1349 12.9 77.4 9.6
1906 203 1037 131 1372 14.8 75.6 9.5
1907 226 1121 141 1489 15.2 75.3 9.5 Source: Table 3 Butlin. p. 511908 238 1204 153 1595 14.9 75.5 9.6
1909 246 1311 154 1710 1'4.4 76.7 9.0
1910 272 1418 158 1849 14.7 76.7 8.5 Chart C Butlin p. 48
1911 297 1572 157 2026 14.7 77.8 7.7
1912 344 1758 177 2278 15.1 77.2 7.8
1913 377 1888 186 2451 15.4 77.0 7.6
1914 404 1987 193 2583 15.6 76.9 7.5
1915 467 2027 205 2700 17.3 75.1 7.6
1916 463 2017 198 2678 17.3 7E.3 74
1917 474 1972 198 2645 17.9 7·I.f. 75
1918 448 1966 201 2613 17.1 7!).:~ 7.7
1919 452 2007 204 2664 17.0 7H.:1 7.7
1920 435 2170 193 2798 15.5 7;'.li 6.~
1921 449 2259 187 2894 15.5 78.1 6.5
1922 449 2338 233 3021 14.9 77.4 7.7
1923 482 2351 229 3064 15.7 76.7 7.5
1924 535 2460 273 3269 16.4 75.3 8.4
1925 569 2582 306 3458 16.5 74.7 8.8
1926 565 2671 344 3580 15.8 74.6 9.6
1927 578 2687 366 3631 15.9 74.0 10.1
1928 541 2740 440 3721 14.5 73.6 11.8
1929 539 2726 470 - 3734 14.4 73.0 12.6 0 o'1930 523 2562 478 3563 14.7 11.9 13.4 Q) 0 0 0 0... ,... co c.D -q- C\l 0ro1931 477 2351 398 3226 14.8 72.9 12.3 .c ) !1932 480 2242 398 3120 15.4 71.9 12.6 en I 01933 499 2275 409 3183 15.7 71.5 12.6 ~ I i r-,1934 545 2328 493 3365 16.2 69.2 14.7 ())
1935 583 2441 516 3543 16.5 66.9 14.6 0 ! ,...
1936 588 2453 527 3566 16.4 68.8 14.6 .c ;
1937 630 2587 523 3740 16.8 69.2 14.0 C!
...... i1938 667 2658 520 3845 17.3 69.1 13.5 Cl) ro , 01939 701 2702 576 3980 17.6 67.9 14.5 E Q) , , ro~ ())1940 834 2706 558 4099 20.3 66.0 13.6 C I ,...
... c I
1941 1112 2856 490 4461 24.9 64.1 11.0 ~ <ll °en I
Io c EQ)-1942 1882 2878 457 5217 36.1 55.2 8.8 Cl :J E ...... ro I1943 2271 2811 410 5492 41.4 51.2 7.5 .., o2g 01944 2117 2854 415 5382 39.3 53.0 7.7 og ()(J)..J i1945 1920 2896 433 5250 38.6 55.2 - 8.2 Ii i ())fI) ,...--0 :1948 1497 3263 530 5290 28.3 61.7 10.0 ell <ll I1947 1585 3471 586 5641 26.1 61.5 10.4 >-0 I . ' .... "'.Q) c: :1948 1688 3594 607 5889 28.7 . 61.0 10.3 ..J Q)
,,'" ,.'1949 1821 3733 630 6184 29.4 60.4 10.2 >'fI) ,. ...
.' '01950 2011 3908 645 6564 . 30.8 59.5 9.8 .Cl ... / (. ~... '" ())C <ll , ,...1951 2088 4029 668 6783 30.8 59.4 9.8 Cl) >. I f '1952 2027 4186 663 6876 29.5 60.9 9.6 E • I1953 2002 4070 650 6722 29.8 60.5 9.7 >."<t f~ -,:1954 2023 4342 657 7022 26.8 61.8 9.4 0";- 0-C') I1955 2098 4508 693 7299 28.7 61.8 9.5 0.1"- I C')Eo> , ~, ())
1958 2130 4584 704 7418 28.7 61.8 9.5 lJJ ,... _ I
"\ ,...1957 2152 4621 706 7479 28.8 61.8 9.4 c: 0 I1958 2200 4719 736 7655 28.7 61.6 9.6 .~ ..... I
1959 2238 4835 769 7840 28.5 61.7 9.8 ~o I
'\1960 2260 4821 803 7884 28.7 61.1 10.2 ._ I I 00 0 \ C\l0 \
f
1961 2306 4979 841 8126 28.4 61.3 10.3 0> ())
1962 2341 5075 875 8291 28.2 61.2 10.6 . ,... I ,...
1963 2397 5192 895 8484 28.3 61.2 10.5 0
,)1964 2487 5280 909 8678 28.7 60.9 10.5 t: i .1965 2610 5340 934 8884 29.4 . 60.1 10.5 '"s: , 0
2795 5644 996 9435 29.6 59.8 10.6 0 \ { ,...1966 \ O'l1967 2930 5732 993 9655 30.3 59.4 10.3 ,...
1968 3031 5904 1036 9971 30,4 59.2 10.4 I :
1969 3131 6058 1029 10218 30.6 59.3 10.1 Q) ( i...1970 3266 6218 1048 10532 31.0 59.0 10.0 CIl \ i.£: \ 01971 3354 6197 1074 10625 31.6 58.3 10.1 en 0
1972 3422 6381 1184 10987 31.1 .58.1 10.8
,pO 0 0 0 0 O~1973 3562 6540 1227 11329 31.4 57.7 10.8 o 0 -CO c.D -q- C\l1974 3743 6806 1166 11715 32.0 58.1 10.0 ,...
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TABLE 4
Year. Number. Annual % increase.
1948 60687
1949 74389 22.6
1950 83615 12.4
1951 86134 3.0
1952 78443 - 8.9
1953 75562 - 3.6
1954 72970 -:.3~ 4
1955 74253 1.2
1956 74503 0.3
1957 75362 1.2
1958 76137 1.0
1959 76983 1.1
1960 76905 - 0;1.
1961
1962 80124
1963 83076 3. T
1964 85873 3.4·
1965 90821 5.6,
1966 97530 <'7.4.
1967 103884 6.5.
1968 109733 5.6·
1969 115129 4.9
1970 123406 7.2
1971 127212 3.1
1972 132557 4.2
1973 138944 4.8
1974 146300 5.3
1975 155489 6.3
1976 157765 1.1
1977 154512 - 2.1
* excludes staff of the former Postmaster- General's Department.
Source: Public Service Board Annual Reports and 1977 Statistical
Yearbook.
CHAPTER TWO
CLASSES IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SERVICE
There has been a significant attempt to come to grips with the
internal dynamics of the capitalist state: Therborn's "The Dictatorship of
the Proletariat and the Class Character of the State Apparatus". The
essay seeks to explain the bourgeois class character, not of current government
policies, but of the way in which contemporary capitalist states are
organisedl;in contrast to the features of proletarian and feudal states.
Therborn's preliminary literature survey14 indicates that marxists have
hardly tackled the problem at all, although Anderson's Lineages of the
Absolutist State and Bettelheim's Class Struggles in the USSR are useful
by virtue of their analyses of the pre- and post-capitalist state,
respectively.
The basic definition of the state is taken from Poulantzas; it is a
"materialized concentration of the class relations of a given society". 15
The metaphor of "crystallization" is crucial to this definition and entails
-'
an over-rigorous distinction between state and society: "The patterning
of state personnel therefore, only expresses the class relations of society
in a mediated ,...ay". "the state apparatus feeds back into soc i ety a
contribution to the regeneration of the class relations which formed it,,17
Class relations are crystallized in the state, they exist in society.
State apparatuses are conceptualised as "organisations" - systems of
input • transformation and output mechanisms which are "traversed and
18
shaped by the class struggle" That is, the contradictions in society are
expressed in the contents of these organisational mechanisms which process
the "factors": 1) organisational tasks 2) personnel 3) material resources
and 4) organisational technolpgy. The last is the strategic variable, which
is not transformed in the organisation and "enters the organisation from the
prevailing state of the social forces and relations of production" ie from
outside.
-14-
Therborn's originality lies in his attribution of the forms of
organisational technology to the effects of class struggle. It is now
possible to say that the bourgeois state is capitalist not only because its
policies are capitalist (determined in the class struggle) but also
because its internal structure, especially its organisational technologies,
is determined by class struggle: "Every organisation has formal procedures ...
produced by the class struggle and constitut(ing) crystallization of class
relations,,19. Thus bureaucracy, the organisational technology of the
state in the period of competitive capitalism is determined by its role
as regulator of the market. This requires calculability,specialisation
and hierarchy. 20 The organisation technology of the monopoly:·c.apitalist
state, "managerial technocracy", is characterised by technical flexibility
as opposed to the discipline of bureaucracy2~ The determining function
of the monopoly capitalist state is intervention in the market to cope with
the increasing complexity of technology and the challenge of the working class~21
Despite Therborn's leap beyond the commonplace of identifying
state policies as the outcome of class struggle, to a recognition that the
state's internal organisation is an effect of class struggle, his analysis
suffers from some serious flaws. They derive from his crystallization
metaphor and the relationship between 'state' and 'society' it entails. The
problem of the state/society relationship is constituted in the Althusserian
problematic. For Althusser and Poulantzas as well as Therborn, class struggle
takes place in society and not (or only in a limited or mediated form)
within the state. Althusser sees state apparatuses as a means of reproducing
the relations of production, which are external to them. Class contradictions
are possible within ideological state apparatuses, (lSA's) eg media, the church,
I
the family, education system, but not repressive state apparatuses, ego
army, police, courts. However the contradictions in l.S.A. 's only express
-15-
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class struggle. The kind of struggle appropriate to I.S.A.'s is only
ideological class struggle. 24 It is not appropriate to talk about class
struggles inside state apparatuses because they take place within the
relations of production or have state power (Althusser has added the forms
of ideology) as their object, ie state apparatuses are not themselves
constituted out of (specific) production relations .. This difficulty can
be traced to the over-rigorous Althusserian distinction between economic,
political and ideological instances. This excludes the possibility of
categories appropriate to the "economic", ie relations of production,
being applied to political (state) institutions. Economic class struggle,
by state employees is thus absent from the Althusserian picture of the
state. Therborn's attribution of organisational technology to the class
struggle reproduces the difficulty because, for him, the class struggle
is external to the state. Thus he falls back on orthodox social science
(organisation theory) to explain the state's internal structure, because
the nlarxist tools of analysis - antagonistic class relations (of production)
within the state - are not available to him. 25The A1thusserian conception of
the state can also lead to a particular approach to the state in a revolutionary
contextt~ reliance on fissures within state apparatuses as the basis for
revolutionary action. This is elaborated by Poulantzas. 26Such conclusions
are cooonensurate with Therborn's analysis, which bears a striking resemblance
to the neo-Ricardian conception of production. For it the class struggle
takes place outside the production process, but it is a crucial variable in
economic developments. For Therborn the class struggle takes place outside
the state but is crucial to the nature of state policies and organisation.
His "model of organisations" is like the neo-Ricardian labour process or
the "organisation" of orthodox sociology - focusing on the technical aspects
of institutions, rather than the social or class ones. By explaining
"organisational technologies" in terms of their adequacy to the "tasks
of the state", Therborn assumes that
.. .,.16".
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that "organisational technologies" are also means of class control is
excluded. 28By giving orthodox sociology a scientific status, Therborn
reproduces this rejection of the appropriateness of concepts of historical
materialism to analysis of the internal workings of the state. Not only
is this avenue for marxist research closed off, but the study of the way
in which "behavioural sciences" can be ideologies for the maintenance of
class control over the labour process is also made impossible. It is
argue? below that the latter perspective is crucial for a marxist understanding
of the effectiveness of management's "work humanisation" strategies.
If the possibility of production relations,ie relations of class control,
existing within state institutions is admitted, a new approach to explaining
the capitalist nature of the state in bourgeois society is opened up. The
study of the state as. a 'Iabour process and antagonistic class relations
within it, provides the basis for understanding the state's internal dynamic
and the way in which it, despite a specific function, is both above and a
part of civil society. Instead of explaining that state apparatuses are
"independent of current state policies and class relations" because they are
the crystallizations of old social relations 29 ie because of historical
r .,
'remnants', the ,~Irelative aut onomy'? of the state can be understood in terms
of the class struggle within its institutions as well as the limitations imposed
by the accumulation process. Moreover, by examining the class relations within
the state, the adequacy of different political strategies aimed at orienting
state employees towards socialist change can be assessed •
The question of whether state employees can be allocated to different
social classes provides a basis for'the examination. of the.'
production relations within the state. Moreover the question of ,the class
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affiliation of public servants and the defining characteristics of the
Labour . .. processes in state apparatuses are crucial to an understanding of
their revolutionary potential, It is not merely a matter of taxonomy.
HistD~ical materialism identifies the proletariat as the only class capable
of self-emancipation ie the smashing of bourgeois class rule and the
establishment of its own 'fdictatorshipf'as the precondition for a new classless
mode of production. The issue of whether a group of employees is proletarian
or not will determine its relationship to the working class asa whole in
the context of revolutionary organisation and struggle. In all but
exceptional circumstances, aggregates of members of the working class have a
material interest in socialism, although this may be (and usually is) disguised
by bourgeois ideological hegemony. Other groups of employees (particularly
the "middle lawyers"/"new middle-class"/"new petty bourgeoisie") may have some
interest in social change, but it need not be unambiguously anti-capitalist.
Furthermore there are differences in the kinds of organisations (unions/
professional associations),and revolutionary expectations appropriate to them,
according to the class affiliation of their memberships. A rank and file
strategy may be appropriate to telephone linespeople or clerical assistants,
but not doctors or professional engineers.
The debate which emerged from Poulantzas' treatment of the class position
of "white collar" workers provides a useful starting point for an analysis of
state employees, especially Commonwealth Public Servants. According to
Poulantzas the most important aspect of the . labour . process, for defining
the proletariat is whether it is productive or not. The "new wage earning
groupings" ie white collar workers, constitute a part of the new petty
bourgeoisie because, despite the fact they they do not own the means of
production, they do not perform productive labour ie produce material commodities.
-18~
This is justified because"Productive labour always refers to labour that is
performed under definite social conditions, and thus is directly dependent
on the social relations of exploitation of a given mode of production"~O
The implication is that unproductive labour is not performed under definite
social relations, even, say, unproductive labour in a bank, or a commercial
capitalist enterprise. However, work in a bank takes place in social
conditions where the money capitalist is trying to maximise his/her
realisation of surplus value, this means that the crucial social relation of
employment in the/enterprise is constrained to be the wage contract ie
exchange of variable capital for labour power, which is the basic social
relation under capitalism. In his critique of Poulantzas, Wright dismisses
the productive/unproductive labour distinction as largely irrelevant to the
31
material interests of different groups of workers. The nature of material
interests is the touchstone of class position.
Poulantzas also allocates fore~en and supervisors to the new petty
bourgeoisie, by virtue of their "political" role in the production process,
and technicians and engineers" by virtue of their ideological place in
ideological relations. In doing this he equates economic relations purely
with the technical division of labour; the social division of labour is
ideological or political. Not only does thds.c Ioud: the economic' dimension
of the social division of labour but it also undermines the materialist
basis of class theory by giving political and ideological criteria equal
status to economic ones. 32 Nevertheless "supervision" is an aspect of
economic, not political relations. Poulantzas also maintains that the whole
new petty bourgeoisie is in ths camp bf mental rather than manual labour
ie performs roles of ideological domination vis a vis the working class. 33
However, Braverman has shown that the kind of work performed by the lower
~chelon of white collar labour (Poulantzas' new petty bourgeoisie) can less
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and less be characterised as mental rather than manual. 34
The conclusion which Poulantzas draws from his analysis is that
alliances between the proletariat and new petty bourgeoisie (who constitute
a larg~r proportion of the population)35 are crucial for any revolutionary
strategy and that these must be based on "objectives which can transform
these allies in the course of the uninterupted struggle and its stages,
account being taken of their specific class determination and the specific
polarisation which affects them,,36 The allocation of unproductive workers,
including most state employees, to the new petty bourgeoisie, is commensurate
with Poulantzas' picture of class relations in the state. There may be a
polarisation of state employees between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
but this is an external relationship, since there is no, working class inside
the state itself. This adds weight to his argument that vertical fractures
in the state will provide the focus for revolutionary social change. 37
According to Wright's critique of Poulantzas, certain categories of
employees cannot be allocated specifically to one class. On the basis of
purely economic relations, they occury "contradictory class locations". That
is, they are not owners of the means of production, nor are they purely
labourers 38, because part of their income comes out of surplus value, as the
reward for acting on behalf of capital in the labour process. 39 The more
contradictory the class location of these layers, the more important are
ideological and political factors in determining their objective class
position in a particular situation. This approach has the advantage of
ground class analysis in economic relations, while giving due weight to
non-economic factors in explaining the relation of forces in a particular
context. Wright extends the idea of contradictory class relations to the
police and army by pointing to a contradiction between economic and political
relations. 1he value of this extension is less apparent than the original
concept - it no longer relates to economic relations alone
.,.20.,.
and, to the extent that a majorlty of workers give political support to the
capitalist state, and are subject to bourgeois ideology, there is a "non-
correspondence" in their economic and political relations. The question is
not .' correspondence/non-correspondence but. the specific relationship
between members of repressive state apparatuses and the capitalist state and
its ideologies, at the level of day to day practice, not abstract definition .
.)
That is, in terms of production relations a police constable or army private
may be proletarian, but, by virtue of their membership of particular state
institutions and subordination to particular ideologies, they can be expected~
in most situations~to defend bourgeois class interests. Wright has attempted
,/
to extend his analysis to state employees, using the idea of non-correspondence
in their ideological rOles. 40However, for an adequate extension of the
analysis to state employees (as well as more explicit exposition for employees
of capitalist enterprises), the precise nature of the production relations
they are engaged in must be examined. Carchedi, an Althuss er[an likePoulantzas,
provides such an analysis.
Carchedi comes to similar conclusions to Wright's, but provides a more
detailed analysis of exactly where the contradiction in the production relations,
experienced by the "new middle class',' lies. Like Poulantzas, Carchedi
identified the key aspects of the production relations and production processes.
However the particular aspects are different. Instead of the distinction
between productive and unproductive labour, he sees the basic determinants
of social class, in the labour process as:
1. the place occupied in the system of social production - is it
that of a labourer or non-labourer?
2. relation to the means of production - does the place entail
ownership of the means of production or ~t?
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3. role in the social organisation of labour - does the place
involve the performance of the "global function of capital"
("supervision and management" of workers) or the "function
of the collective labourer"?
4. distribution relations arising from 1, 2 &3 - what is the
pla.ce's share of total:income; mode of acquisition of income
and its origin (wage or surplus value)1
This approach accounts for factors within the labour process, which
Poulantzas artificially separates from it: supervision which he calls
"political" and the mental/manual labour dichotomy which he calls "ideological".
By avoiding this separation Carchedi preserves an understanding of the unity
of the labour process and the interchangeability of different techniques of
control within it, as far as the employer is concerned.
Initially Carchedi applies his framework to productive capitalist
enterprises, then to unproductive capitalist enterprises (bank and commercial
capital) and then to non-capitalist state institutions. The extension of the
analysis is undertaken by employing the concept of "economic oppression". As
opposed to exploitation, which is the appropriation of surplus value in commodity
producing labour processes, economic oppression is the appropriation of surplus
labour in non-commodity producing labour processe~ . ie ones where "services"
42
are produced. That is, the worker in a non-material production process does
not produce material commodities (ie exchange values) and so can It be exp-lcd.ted,";
however s/he is paid a wage tendentially equal to value of his/her labour power
(as in productive enterprises) and performs more labour than would be necessary
to repToduce his/her labour power. This appropriation of surplus labour will
be labelled "economic oppression". The fact that the worker is not paid the
value equivalent of his/her labour but only of his/her labour power, means that
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the realisation of surplus value (produced elsewhere ie in productive
enterprises) in the un~roductive enterprise is cheaper for the capitalist
(bank or commercial) in charge of it.
The same is true of non-capitalist state institutions (Qantas, TAA, ANL
are capitalist enterprises which happen to be owned by the state). However,
unlike an unproductive capitalist enterprise, the non~capitalist state
Ins t i tuti.ons.ido not employ labour in order to realise surplus value, but
primarily to produce use values. Whereas in the capitalist enterprise exchange
value dominates use value (production is for profit) in the nml-capitaiist
state institution the use value dominates the exchange value (which exists
because state services do or could have equivalents on the market) - production
is not for profit. In other words the efficiency of the labour processes
ie' in the extraction of surplus labour in these state insitutions, is not
imposed by the market or the maximisation of profit. Carchedi argues that
the production of use values in non-capitalist state insitutions occurs "just
as capitalist commodities are produced" because it takes place "in a
structure dominated by the capitalist production process and relations~it is
J
dominated by this structure and thus takes place according to capitalist criteriiA
It is possible to be more explicit about the exact mechanism involved.' here.
44State expenditu~es are a deduction from surplus value. To the extent that
this is the cas 7 there: is pressure on the "bureaucracy" from the capitalist
class to ensure its efficiency. This works through Parliamentary checks eg
the Public Accounts Committee, and the activities of the Public Service Board,
as well as "public opinion". Within the public service it involves the
constraints on "responsible" ie supervi s i.ng officers to ensure that the tasks
allocated to them are effectively carried out, if they are to have successful
careers.
Particularly when there is a crisis of accumulation, as at present,
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there will be more dramatic attempts to allocate surplus value away from
state activities to capitalist enterprises. This not only takes the form
of curtailment of those activities which most benefit the working class
(Medibank, welfare payments, education etc) but also of drives to minimise
expenditure on remaining activities. The crudest means for doing this
involves across the board restriction or cutting back of the n~ber of
public servants - "staff ceilings". This and-other approaches considered
below, involve the intensification of economic opp~ession. Thus while
the labour process within the capitalist state is not directly subject to
the constraints of capital accumulation, through the market, it is subject
to them through "political" mechanisms.
Carchedi's analysis leads to the conclusion that social classes
exist within state apparatuses in the srone way as in economic apparatuses.
Thus "the nurse, the teacher etc (we could include clerical assistants and
junior clerks here), employed by the state are objectively identifiable as
proletariat (sic) inasmuch as (1) they do not own the means of production, (2)
they are expropriated of surplus labour (economically oppressed). (3) they
perform' the function of the collective worker, and (4) they receive a wage
(a) tendentially equal to the value of their labour power (h) produced in
the productive sphere of the economy and (c) paid to them by the state .... ,,45
Just as the category "proletarian" can be applied to some state employees,
so can that of "new middle class" which Carchedi defines as those employees
who (1) do not own the means of production legally or economically ie r,exe:rcise
effective control (2) perform the global function of capital and that of the
r- .
collective worker (3)are) labourer and non-labourer ie are oppressed to the
extent that they perform surplus labour and are economic oppressors in so
far as they facilitate the· extraction of surplus labour from others (4)
consequently receive a combination of a wage and income (like a capitalist).
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Finally there is a part of the bourgeoisie who are, formally, employees! of
the state. l~ile they do not legally own the means of production in, say,
a government department, they essentially determine the way in which they
are deployed. Increasingly, departmental heads have the determinate voice
in the acquisition of new means of production and staffing arrangements.
Having accepted the implications of Carchedi's/analysis, it will be
useful to roughly identify the lines of class cleavage within the public
service.
The finely graded hierarchy of the APS makes the drawing of dividing
lines difficult. Salaries, which we assume reflect class differences at
some remove, vary only slightly in single steps, but quite substantially
over'..whole divisions. For example the difference between the fourth step
in the third division class 5 salary and the first step in class 6 is only
$347 per annum (at 3rd June, 1978),but there is a difference of 2~ times
in the salaries of the lowest and highest classifications in the third
division (see table 5). A further difficulty is that particular duties
and responsibilities are generally smeared across a number of classifications,
and duty statements generally conclude with If ••• and other duties as directed".
Moreover the hierarchies in different locations may not be totally commensurate.
Thus in the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations, a clerk class
6 may be the manager of a small regional CES office but be engaged in relatively
routine activity, without any managerial tasks in the Department's central
office.
The location of class boundaries within the public service has considerable
practical significance,in the context of a rank and file industrial/political
strategy. Such an approach attempts to organise workers around their specific
and general (class) interests on the shop (office) floor, rather than trying to
'\
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articulate them directly by means of the capture and manipulation of bureaucratic
trade union positions. The ACOA and, APSA, clearly include members of the
working class and the new middle class. In both cases, the union is dominated
by those higher up the job hierarchy. The mass of the membership, at the
lower level~ have distinct class interests to those higher up who enjoy
priveleges, by virtue of their performance of the global function of capital:
the latter can be expected to be more concerned with ~age relativities and to
have ambiguous positions on managements prerogat tve., The coherence of the
rank and file strategy thus depends on it being based amongst the most
proletarian elements in the organisation in question. The Government
Employees Action'~t.o~p (GEAG or Grey Collar Group) has limited its membership
to public servants below class 6 in the Third Division. 46
The class nature of the public service hierarchy is apparent in the
procedures for classifying positions (establishments). In most areas
classification is on the basis of Position Classification Standards which consist,
essentially, of model duty statements to which the position under consideration
is compared. In the clerical/administrative area there are, at present, no
official standards and classification is on the basis of comparision with
duty statements, unofficially regarded as representative. Classification is
therefore undertaken on the basis of uniformity and the integrity of the
hierarchy.
The factors on which classifications are based, as they emerge from
duty statements are: complexity, decision making powers, level of advice,
supervision received, supervision given, level of liason, expertise, breadth
of knowledge. The factors concerning sup~rvision, given and received, and
decision making powers (concerning the committment of resources) are the
most directly significant to a first approximation of class position. The
oth~rs are important especially to the extent that they legitimise the
hierarchy in terms of "qualifications" and "competence". While they are not
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commensurate with the categories"whichan'extensive,marxi?t analysis would
employ these factors can be understood within a marxist framework.
In terms of their salaries and the amount of supervisory work they do,
almost all members of the Fourth Division could be characterised as members
of the working class. This is particularly the case with clerical classifications
(manual classifications include eg foremen). Members of the Fourth Division
,
are much more concentrated in the lower classes (1-4 of eight), 93%, than
those of the Third Division (1-6 of eleven), 76.2%. The lower reaches of
the Third Division are also proletarian; their work is routine and generally
closely supervised, their salaries are frequently lower than those at the
top of the Fourth Division and their own supervisory activities limited,
The upper three classes of the Third Division are far from proletarian,,;,
supervisory functions constitute an important part of their duties, their
salaries are substantial and their conditions of employment privIleged - they
are not required to fill in flex-sheets and are not paid overtime. Classes
9, 10 and 11 and the lower portion of the Second Division clearly fall into
the new middle class. Classifications 6-8 are more difficult to allocate.
They have significant supervisory functions and authority over some departmental
resources,however their own autonomy is limited. They are recognised as
junior management and have some expectation of gaining positions near the top
of the third divis ion. Depending on the particular job, their orientation
and interests may be identified with their superiors or those lower down the
hierarchy. Their class location is middle class, though on its proletarian
boundary.
The power to deploy the resources of a department, and frequently to C',;:!
determine what those resources actually are, lies with its permanent head, and,
to some extent the First Assistant Secretaries, especially in large depa~tments.
It is these people, the First Division and top of the Second Division, who
constitute the bourgeoisie within the state.
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YABLES PUBLIC SERVICE SALARIES (~lerical Designations)
June '1978.
Classification.
Fourth Division a. Grade 1
Grade 2
Grade 3
Grade 4
Grade 5
Grade 6
Grade 7
Grade 8
Third Division b Class 1
under 18
18
19
20
21
Class 2/3
Class 4
Class 5
Class 6
s
7260
7387
7513
7639
7767
7890
8018
8140
8264
8447
8633
8820
9005
9191
9373
9570
9839
10111
10381
10658
10932
11209
11548
11887
12224
12562
, 4835
5641
6528
7334
8059
8337
8615
8891
9168
9438 I
9737
10038
10343
10647
10954
11304
11651
11991
12335
12680
13022
13366
13710
14057
14.5'19
14979
Classification $
Class 7 15435
15898
16359
: Class 8 17051
17739
Class 9 :-18425
19108
Class 10 19799
20487
Class 11 21175
21862
Second Division Level 1 25569
Level 2 27966
Level 3 30361
Level 4 32756
Level 5 35150
Level 6 37546
First Division 39987
43134
45231
Sources a APSA circular No 1978/22
b ACOA Journal July 1978,
c for Department of Stat e "
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PUBLIC SERVICE LABOUR PROCESS
In accepting Carchedi's analysis we have established that social
Classes exist·inside capitalist state institutions. It is now necessary
to determine the ~aysin which the relations between these classes express
themselves and the characteristics which make state employment a distinct
area of employment within the (Australian) capitalist economy. The
containment of the working class has .been examined from two, related,
perspectives. Braverman examines the day to day attempts by management
to control the way in which work is done, focusing on the evolution of
job structures and particular management ideologies. This approach is
used extensively in Part I.
A second approach takes the structure of the labour market as its
object. This kind of analysis has been initiated in Australia by John Col1ins
who identifies six major "segments" in the work force, layered according
to sex and race, which are disproportionately represented in particular
occupations. The segmentation of the APS, along sex lines, is especially
evident. Single women were excluded from the permanent service until 1949,
married women until 1965. Thus many women were confined to temporary
classifications. Women are still dramatically under-represented in the 'tI
upper echelons of the service, less than 1% of PSA second division officers
in 1976, and are over-represented in the fourth division, 55%.47 In
clerical designations (typists, clerical assistants), the imbalance in the
I
fourth division is even more marked. 'Northern european males dominate the
first, second and third divisions; Sourthern european males are more strongly
d . 1 f h d' .. . b 48represente 1n manua ourt 1V1S10n JO s.
Collins outlines what he calls vertical divisions in the working class
(layers) but only refers to "the horizontal differentiation into different
· "b" 49econom1C sectors as e1ng 1mportant. Edwards provides a framework for
extending the labour market approach to this kind of differentiation and
hence a basis for understanding the peculiar characteristics of public
service employment. He maintains that large firms have "internal
labour markets". Labour markets are mechanisms which regulate the purchase
and sale of labour power. Large firms (or public services) internalise
these mechanisms through regularised promotion procedures and evaluation
of workers. In the APS this is known as the "career service", the
expectation that, entering at a base grade, workers have good prospects of
being promoted up the hierarchy in the course of their employment. 50 Not
only does the internal labour market include job ladders, but also the ways
in which disputes are settled 'and wages set. The separate system of public
service arbitration (although it is articulated to the wider Conciliation
and Arbitration Act) under the Public Service Arbitration Act 1920-1978 51
is the clearest expression of this for PSA employment.
Edwards maintains that the growth of large corporations led to a new
form of contro l within the firm: "bureaucratic controI'l, "Simple hierarchy",
the old form of control, was based on the personal supervision of workers.
As the layers of supervisors increased and the evaluation of complex tasks
became more difficult, personal supervision became a less adequate guarantee
of productivity. Moreover the principal sanction of simple hierarchy ,-
dismissal - became less effective as workers unionised or because workers
I
with specialised skills were difficult ,to ~eplace. Bureaucratic control was
"devised both as a part of the corporation's response to the general worker
threat to capitalist hegemony and as a specific strategy to ameliorate the
.. f l' h f' 52crlS1S 0 contro ln t e lrm.
The characteristics of bureaucratic control are: definition of jobs
,
by formalised work criteria eg:the duty statements of the APS, rather than
. .
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the specific directions of the supervisor; measurement of work performance
against these criteria; exercise of power (of supervisors) according to
.b d 1 ( . f i d' h PSA d I' ) 53prescrl e ru es as specl le ln t e an regu atlons
The advantages of this form of organisation are that:
a) "power relations of hierarchical authority are made invisible, submerged
and embedded in the structure and organisation of the firm rather than
54
visibly and openly manifest in personal, arbitrary power."
b) the emphasis on formal authority makes a greater differentiation of the
hierarchy possible, making working class unity more difficult to achieve,55
c) subject to regulations him or herself, the supervisor was less obviously
and adversary to workers, but at the same time more subject to evaluation
from above.
d) the above meant that unions accepted the organisation of work more readily
and "directed their energies towards non-control issues (wages, fringe
benefits, procedures for promotion, hiring and firing),,56
The analysis of internal labour markets and bureaucratic control in
monopoly capitalist firms provides a material basis for understanding the
specific character of public employment. For in addition to the forms of
internalising their labour markets and imposing bureaucratic control of
private capitalist firms, the state can give weight to its internal market
and control by means of legislation. The ideology of public service neutrality,
which serves to isolate public service workers from the rest of the working
I
class, has a material basis in conditions of employment. As well as a
distinct system of arbitration, public servants are subject to special
legal sanctions for transgressing the rules of the service. These apply to
breaches of official secrecy and engaging in strike action. 57 Edwards'
approach avoids the dangers of Poulantzas' characterisation which emphasises
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the influences of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology in shaping the
features of (state) bureaucracy. The former grounds these features and
ideologies on the material practices which constitute bureaucracy as a
labour process and avoid recourse to Weberian sociology (which after a
critique Poulantzas recommends, and Therborn takes up).58
The above analysis has established that the internal structure
of the capitalist state and the APS in particular, is a specific labour
process. It is reasonable to conclude that, apart from external constraints
and personnel, the capitalist state is tied to bourgeois society because
its internal structure is capitalist. The practical content of the
program of "smashing the state" is therefore the destruction of the
specifically capitalist labour processes which constitute state institutions.
1~e proletarian state has to be constructed along new lines, not only in its
relationsbip. to the organs of (proletarian) political power but also in
its production relations. ' To the extent that communist. relations of
production are established within the proletarian state, the possibilities
of its withering way as a specialised body increases.
The existence of labour processes, structuring the APS and the
specific characteristics of its internal labour mar~et have now been
established; On this basis some of the more significant changes in the
nature of work in the public service since World War 11 and the responses
to them can be examined.
PART TWO - SOME DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1945
. I
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CHAPTER FOUR
1945~tb,.' 1970
The initial post~war developments, considered here, do not, strictly,
fall into the category of the struggle for the control of work. However, both
Joint Consultation and staff ceilings prefigure the present tactics for
management control in the public APS. Joint Consultation because worker
participation is one aspect of the current wave of "work humanisation",
staff ceilings because t oday they are again a part of the context for
struggle in the public service.
During the late 1940's and early 1950's there was a spate of interest . i
in "joint consultation": 59 works commi.t t ees-roj management and employee
representatives, convened to discuss matters of mutual interest (usually.l
excluding wages). The inspiration for joint consultation was largely
from the British experience of productivity committees during World War 11.
However, the British precedent fitted in well with the reform, liberal
ideology dominant in the 1940' sand. espoused by leading public servants such
60
as Coombs and Lloyd Ross.
A survey during World War:IT had found only 14 joint committees but by
61 621952, 51 were found. By the early 1960's, a number of these had disappeared.
Joint consultation may have been seen, at the time, as a means for circumscribin~
trade union influence and militancy. This was certainly the case for one
firm which set up joint committees in 1953. 63
TI1e Labor government demonstrate~ its faith in joint consultatio~
through its ammendments to the PSA in 1945. These provided fi}.J.' the es tab l.Lsnmerrt
of a Joint Council of the Public Service, representative of manag~ment~ the
PSB and trade unions (it first met in March 1947), joint classifications
and promotions appeals committees. There was no further significant expansion
of worker participation in the APS until the early 1970's.64 Moreover the
joint classifications committees did not survive into the 1960's. They
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served their purpose by 1egitimising/,the large scale reclassification of
the service following the war. The framework within which the committees
worked were determined by one side (the Board) and not jointly. The
thrust of worker participation moves in the 1940's were not strong and
soon faded. It was rather the adoption and spread of Tay10rist techniques
which characterised the period from around 1948 to the early 1960's.
The ruling class offensive650f the late 1940's and early 1950's
entailed attacks on public service workers specifically, as well as the
working class in general. This was initiated through a press campaign66
and took concrete form once the Liberal-Country Party government took office.
As unemployment was increasing the new conservative government aimed to
decrease the public service by 8,500 between May and October 1951: the
, target was exceeded by over 2,000. The ceilings were part of the restructuring
of the APS which had also led to the establishment of classifications
committees. During the' War the proportion of permanent workers in the public
service had declined substantially as the numbers of temporary and exempt,
(from provisions of the PSA) staff rose.
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE 'OF PERMANENT'STAFP'JN THE'APS
Year. Perm'anent' Staffi as:: %; of(totai!.rAPS staff"
1935 75
, I
1940 64
19.45 39
• ~ I 1 .
1950 39
1955 54
1960 63
Source Career Service p. 482
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While the absolute nunilier of public servants fell between 1951
and 1954, the number of permanent staff increased. The APS was thus re-
established as a separate area of employment, with distinct legal provisions
for its employees and its own system of arbitration. During the War the
distinctness of the public service as an internal labour market had been I
diluted. Once the constraints on the activity of APS workers, imposed by I
the War had dissipated, the characteristics of the service as a social
category were reimposed. Moreover the ceilings also helped disorganise
and divide the public service trade unions, which failed to prevent
dismissals, The principle concern of some members of the Commonwealth
Public Service Clerks' Association (CPSCA now ACOA) was that temporaries
be sacked before permanent staff (whom the association covered in the
1'h ' d D' .. ) 67lIlr IVlSlon.
Taylorism in the APS
While staff ceilings were employed for a relatively short period of
time and interest in joint consultation soon waned, the introduction of
"scientific management" known as organisation and methods, (O&M) from the
late 1940's on was to have significance for the next twenty five years
at least, The first O&M positions in the APS were created in 1948.
Until the introduction of O&M, effective public service management had
largely been conceived of in terms of. /establishments 68 practices and leadership.
That is, so long as it had the correct numbers and designations of staff, and
its senior officer offered leadership, a section would function effectively.
Where the traditional "leadership" approach was articulated theoretically, it
b f t U . k B d th f f 1 ,. 69was y re erence 0 rWIC, arnar or 0 er proponents o· orma organIsatIon.
Thus the "chain of command", "field of responsibility", delegation and the
right attitude, were the main considerations of management. The appraisal·
of individJal workers' activity was outside the scope of this particular
managerial science. With the introduction of Taylorism, the study and
design of jobs and their performance was changed from a subjective to an
allegedly scientific practice.
I
Tayl or'i sm (or scientific management) was articulated around the turn
of the century by F.W. Tay10r. Its principles are 7f
1) "the di'ssociation of the labour process from the skills of the workers",
through the arrogation of knowledge about jobs to management, so that
_,worker~ do not know: why they perform them.
2) "the separation of conception from execution", management rather than
workers plan the way in which work is carried out.
3) "management's use of this monopoly of knowledge to control each step of the
I
labour process and its mode of execution"
These principles entail management design of jobs so that workers tasks
require the least amount of skill possible and management controls the pace of
work. Braverman argues that Taylorism spread rapidly during the period before
72World War I. Certainly it had reached Australia by 1917. 73
By the 1920's scientific management was being applied to clerical work. 74
The techniques of time and motion study and the subdivision of Dobs were
found to be as relevant to clerical labour processes as to manual ones. It is
the application of scientific management to clerical work which came to be
known as "Organisation and Methods" in the British Civil Service.
The model for the introduction of 0 &M into the APS came from Britain. 75
During World War 11 0 &M functions were developed in the British Treasury, as
a consequence of the involvement of businessmen, familar with Taylorism, in
the wartime administration. 76 After the W'ar the Treasury set up an." 0 & M
section to advise other departments and to encourage them to set up their own
I
O &M ~ · . ~ 77. I:.ilV1Slons.
There were a number of material conditions which led to the adoption
of British 0 &M ideas in Australia. First was the substantial shift of
employment tor the public sector during the war ,(see tableChapterl), which
was sustained by the growth of government activities just after the war,
The shift from private to public was accompanied by rolproportional increase
in Commonwealth employment, at the expense of the States (see table I ).
In the period before thel~r,APS employment constituted just above 2% of the
total civilian workforce, after the war it was around 5~%:8 The share of
surplus value consumed in the employment activities of the Commonwealth had
thus substantially increased.
The .. s econdc.conddtdon was the ruling class offensive' during the late
1940's and early 19S0'~ which was to establish the basis for Australian
participation in the gl obal, post-war boom. The Chif1ey Labor government was
following policies to restrain "excess demand" until its defeat in 1949. 79
That is, it bowed to the interests of the capitalist class by restraining state
expenditure. This move, together with cuts in taxation (not explicable in a
Keynesian framework and in fact the opposite to normal policy in the context
of excess demand) were policies designed to increase profit rates ie shift
resources from the public to the private sector: redistribute surplus value.
In his 1947 budget speech Chif1ey announced that
A complete review of all Commonwealth departments,
including business undertakings, is being carried
out with the object of/achieving the highest standard
of economy and efficiency in administration on a
peacetime basis ..• the government is determined that
expenditure in all fields shall be kept under the
closet scrutiny to ensure that the community obtains
full value and efficient service. 80
These policies were continued and extended (in the form of staff ceilings)
by the conservative government after 1949.
O&M was seen as a means for increasing "economy and efficiency" in
the Australian APS. In practice this meant that workers produced more, but their
pay was not increased. That is, economic oppression was deepened in order to
( I
minimise the amount of surplus value which has to be allocated to the state
(rather than capital) ,in order for it to fulfil its functions. Thus PSB
Annual reports during the 1950's emphasized the savings in staff numbers
to which 0 &M studies in different departments 1ed. 81 Similar comments
were made in recent reports, r eferr-mg to the reintroduction of PSB Tay.lcrls t
reviews:
An important obj ective of the reviews ',williJbe
to find ways to reduce pressures for staff
growth, through better management of existing
resources. 82
In 1947, W.E. Dunk, a PSB commissioner, saw '0 & M as the means for executing
the Board's previously neglected responsibilities for the oversight of the
economy and efficiency of the APS under section 17 of the PSA. 83In 1948 a
staff of six was established at the PSB to conduct 0 &M investigations. It is
significant that the senior inspector in charge of the 0 &Munit, K.E. Grainger,
became a PSB commissioner in 1953~4 The PSB~s section 17 unit, was small
compared with the British Treasury's 0& Mbranch but the larger departments -
Taxation, PMG, Cus t oms soon followed suit by s et t i.ng up their own units. By
1955, fifteen out of twenty five departments had also done 50. 85 Today almost
every large department or branch has its own 0 &M officers. 86
The PMG was the leading department in the application of 0 &M (and
industrial engineering) techniques. 87 This is not surprising, the Post Office
was also the most advanced part of the APS in taking other inQtiatives eg
in-house training, worker participation. The size of the PMG, its role as
the provider of a commercial service and the relati¥e ~ase with which its
productivity could be measured, made it one of the government instrumentalities
which most closely resembled a private capitalist enterprise. This is even
4
more the case since the Postal and Telecommunications commdss i.onsthave been eat.ab Li.she
.<:
Hence the adoption of the methods of capitalist firms presented few difficulties.
The activities of 0 &Mbranches were various. They were concerned
with the introduction of new office machinery and: furniture, the allocation
of functions within departments, branches and sections and work study. All
of these involve an increase in management control over the labour process,
they entail the appropriation of decisions on how work is to be done by the
superVisor or 0 &M officer, from the workers,- as individuals or collectively.
The reorganisation of work into production lines was a particularly
significant aspect of 0 &M work. A production line is easier to supervise
because workers perform simpler jobs and the rate at which tasks are done can
be more readily assessed and changed. During 1960 a work simplification project
was initiated throughout the Repatriation Department in order to increase
productivity. 88 Such changes were introduced elSewhere, though usually on a
more piecemeal basis. 89 The PSB encouraged these developments in the handbooks
90it produced for managers in different areas.
Work standards are complementary to the introduction of production lines.
The standard is used to determine what the output of an individual or group
should be. S/he or they are then expected to meet the standard and supervision
may be tightened. The legitimacy of work standards is based on their derivation
from an "average worker" or work measurement (decomposition of jobs into
fragments, the performance time of which have been previous ly "established")
Work measurement or work study was only introduced". Int.o, the APS during the
early 1960's.9l Before this the "average' worker" technique was used. 92 Network
analysis, or critical path programing, also entails the use of work standards. 93
Th . f O&M fl t d' P bl' Adm" . 94 A . 1e rlse 0 was re ec e ln u lC lnlstratlon. rtlc es on
O&M began to appear in 1947. Several more appeared during the 1950ls. 95
Initially these dealt with the British experience, but then with Australian
examples. In 1959 the PSB began publishing the 0 &MJournal. It carried
practical articles, by and for 0 &M officers and practitioners on the day to)
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day practice of scientific management in clerical areas. Topics included:
design of forms, accounting methods, clerical work study, office machines etc.
O&M was the main technique of management control during the 1950's.
• IIn 1956 Dunk, by the cha i rman of thePS~_ saw 0 & M as the most important
factor in getting the most out of public servants, followed by training and
ff hanni (. f f d f . l' . . b . f . )96sta applness ln terms 0 com ort an aCl ltles not)o satls actlon .
One of the PSB commissioners, Grainger, defended scientific management against
cri ticisms in 1955. 97 Schaffer had maintained that "One now thinks of
authority and structure as psychological and political, more human and more
complicated", than they .are portrayed by O&M! 98
Scientific management has by no means been entirely displaced by
subsequent developments in work control in the APS. Section 17 of the PSA
(amended in 1973) has a distinctly Tay10rist bent, imposing on the PSB the duty
to divise means for effecting economies and promoting efficiency in the
management and working of departments by -
l~-ci) improved organisation and procedure;
"(H) closer supervision;
"(iii)the simplification of the work of each department, and
the elimination of unnecessary work.... "
The use of section 17 teams by the PSB to examine departmental activities
was a feature of the 1950's and did not survive through the 1960's, though
other PSB and Departmental 0 &M activities did. However, they were re~
established as a part of changes in establishments procedures after 1972.
Efficiency Review teams are made of representatives of the PSB and the
'd- - -- t- t d d 1 db'd 1 99epar men concerne an are e y an outSl e management consu tanto Their
use from 1975 is another index of the extent of the economic crisis in Australia
and consequent pressure on the public service. (see below p. 45)
The introduction of 0 &M into the APS does not seem to have met any
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,~:·:'.trade union opposition. The CPSCA (now ACOA) requested union representation
on the PSB's section 17 "Committee", The Board did not grant it and the
. k f th . 100un10n too no ur er act1on. Favourable comments on the section 17
unit and 0 &M activities have appeared in the Federal Public Service
Journal. l Ol (shared by APSA and ACOA until 1957 wheri the APSA decided to
publish its own Review}. Some cri ticismswere made of the conduct of 0 & M
. ., h ff" . h . f 102 "act1v1t1e7 t at e 1c1ency rat1ng sc ernes were not un1 orm, reorgan1satlons
took effect too slowly and even that the PSB's section 17 teams were not
objective and were politically influenced. 104However these articles did
not reject 0 &M or Tay10rism per se, only certain applications where the
ppactitioners were biassed or incompetent.
The unions have taken exception to some specific Tay10rist
techniques eg bundy clocks. 105Th e APSA has expressed reservations about
ergonomics (work study) in assessing the value of jobs. 106Neither APSA
nor ACOA has a policy on the books relating to Taylorism, 0 &M, work study
etc. ACOA viewed the reintroduction of section 17 teams in 1975 with
.. 107
equanlmlty.
Mechanisation of the APS
The introduction of new technologies and, embodied in them, new means
for controlling work, is one of the main means that the capitalist class has
I
for maintaining its hold over the labour process. That is, accumulation is
a direct consequence of class struggle. Since World War 11, the clerical
labour process has been increasingly subject to accumulation and the
substitution of variable for constant capital. The most striking feature
of this development has been the introduction of automatic data processing
(ADP). Of course there was machinery in offices before the advent of ADP,
but typewriters and adding machines are the clerical equivalents of hand
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108tools or power assisted hand tools. Computers provide a means, not
only for speeding up production but also for eliminating human labour
from whole steps of the labour process, while increasing productivity.
Early in the history of computers, during the 1940's and early
1950's, ADP practitioners were craftspeop1e. By the early 1960's this
craft had been broken down into a hierarchical labour process with a
few programers and systems analysts at the top and a mass of relatively
unskilled key-punch operators and clerical assistants at the bottom. 109
By the time ADP was being widely introduced, including into the APS.,
the craft phase was over and the clerical labour process was augmented
by another labour process already structured, more drastically, along
capitalist lines. The adoption of ADP was an important part of the process
of accumulation in the public service (the employment of larger numbers
of staff and the construction of large office complexes to house them
..
',reriii others) .
As the public service was returning to its pre-staff' ceiling size,in
1958, there was increasing pressure on the government to restrict its growth.
The Cabinet "instructed departments to reduce expenditure through such
. 110
methods as introducing electronic data processing. :'. An interdepartmental
committee on ADP was set up in 1958. 11fhe. use of .~. ADP in the APS is
part of continuing efforts to make "economic and efficient" use of surplus
value expended in government activitfes. In fact ADP was seen as an
112
extension of 0 &M activities (a view shared by Braverman):
Earlier efforts to emphasize the managerial
element in the Commonwealth Administration
include the adoption immediately after the
war of then developing 0 &M and other
I scientific 'management techniques. the
promotion of these techniques continues and 113
with the advent of ADP, has gathered momentum.
O&M branches were frequently responsible for the introduction of
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ADP. 114 The PSB put ADP into the category of methods early on in its
introduction to the APs.115 In 1964 the 0 &M Journal became the
Management Services Journal, to incorporate articles on ADP and industrial
engineering as well as 0 &M. During the 1960's articles on 0 &M in
Public Administration were superceded by studies of the impact of ADP. 116
The Royal Institute of Public Administration (Australia) which published .. 1,
the,·,pur,nal devoted it's 1963 conference to "Public Administration and
117Technology: Today and Tomorrow"
Large scale computer facilities began to be introduced during the
early 1960's, in the larger departments (Tax, PMG, Defence) after considerable
costing and feasibility studies. The first computer for administrative
purposes was installed in 1962. Since then the use of ADP has expanded
dramatically, by 1972 38 departments or instrumentalities under the PSB
had ·major computer sys'tems ,11gnd second generation equipment was already
being introduced.
Computers cut down substantially on the need for clerical staff
involved in the maintainance of extensive systems of files. The initial
impact on staffing may not be dramatic as personnel are shifted from
traditional clerical tasks to computer-based activities, especially data
input. As additional functions are taken over, however, reductions in
staff become possible and increments in work load require fewer staff by
I
comparison with an unautomated system.
The present crisis and staff ceilings h~ve given added impetus to the.
automation of the APS. This has not passed unnoticed by the rUl~ng class
inside the state apparatuses:
In the Commonwealth Service, the existence
of staff ceilings has an incidental and
benefiicd.aL: effect of creating a situation
in which any form of labour saving device
has a special priority.119
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In addition to the use of computers, the development of micro-
processors has meant that other clerical activities can be automated.
Typists jobs are now under threat from "word-processors". A text can be
typed into the machine, then by typing simple instructions it can be
rearranged and ammended. When the text is in the required form it can
be automatically printed to any specified format and stored in the machine
for later use. The production of reports and letters becomes much more
efficient as complete retyping~when making ammendments>becomes unnecessary.
Typists' productivity increases and jobs may be lost.
The introduction of word processors into the department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet in 1977 was expected to increase productivity by
30-40%. The departments of Social Security, Treasury, Primary Industry
and Tax
/
are also installing word processors. Some minor
reclassifications have been involved eg Typists grade 1 to grade 2 and the
PSB is undertaking a review of classifications in the keyboard area. However
shift work has been introduced into. Tax in order to take full
advantage of the new capital equipment, and up to 320 jobs could be
eliminated due to the introduction of word processors in the above departments.
Micrographies (film, fiche, etc) is another area of automation in
the APS, particularly in filing type activities. ' .-
This is particularly the case where computers are
linked to microform output apparatuses or are used in retrieval.
Automation has not attracted a great deal of attentionJ'from ACOA or
ApsA~unti1 recently. During the 1960's they were mainly concerned with
questions of conditions, classifications and arbitration of their members
ki . ADP 120 D . ... 1 (11 1 1 . 1wor lng ln . esplte lnltla unconcern arge sca e clerlca
redundancies as a result of automation is not a practical possibility in our
Li.f t' 11)1211 e rme: The issue of redundancies has raised concern for some time
but
-44-
no action has had to be taken.
(Council of Australian Public Service Organ i sat rons]
In May 1974 CAGEOAadopted a technological change policy. This
related to union involvement in implementation, job satisfaction,
monitoring productivity increases retraining and redundancies. In August
1978 CAGEO's Federal Executive set up a Technological Change Sub-Committee
automation. In March 1977, the Federal Secretary drew the State Branchs '
attention to the issue. 123A circular to members of August 1977 was entitled
"Machines threaten members' jobs". From October 197?' a number of artic les
have appeared in the APSA Review: on computeT$(October 1977) micrographies
(December 1977), word processing (February 1978 and August 1978). The
Association adopted a quite comprehensive automation policy during its
1978 Conf'erance , reproducing positions stated in the Review~24It calls
for centrally determined procedures for management - un~ori negotiations,
reclassifications~ produftivity' flow-ons and redundancy and retraining
125guarantees. The role cast for rank and file members is that of intelligence
gatherers and monitors for union officials who will negotiate agreements.
The question of a shorter working week is not to be determined by the union
membership or even leadership but "will depend on the patterns of technological
change that emerge in the economy" and "the prevailing philosophy of
126
governments and industrial tribunals",' Thus for the Association's practical
activities have amounted to briefs on developments in different departments,
participation in discussions with management and, in Tax' ., bans on word
processors until management agreed to negotiate. The PSB's review of
127Keyboard classifications was regarded as a breakthrough. '
~45~
CHAPTER FIVE
1970 to 1977
The effects of the current crisis of capitalism on the APS were
manifest early, as external constraints - the imposition of staff ceilings
on public service growth. They formed a part of attempts to restrain
government expenditure in order to reduce inflation. Staff ceilings are
, 1 A Li f'" 1·' " h . b l i . 128a unlque y ustra lan means or ratlona lslng t e pu lC serVlce.
A more common approach has entailed: introduction of new management
techniques, consequent on official inquiries; greater capital investment
and centralisation of employment; intensification of the Labour iof public
129
sector workers. These measures have also been employed in Australia to
some extent: the Coombs and Bland reports and their State equivalents;
accelerated automation of the office; centralisation of the public service
in Canberra eg the proposed transfer of the Department of Employment and
Industrial Relations from Melbourne, and its concentration in large office
complexes eg the Trade Group Building in Barton and the Cameron Offices in
Belconnen. However staff ceilings have been central to Australian governments
cost cutting efforts. They are also an obvious (put not the only) means through
which senior management is constrained to act in response to the crisis, in a
similar way to managers in the private sector.
The imposition of staff ceilings has not been confined to conservative
governments,
TABLE 7 STAFF CEILINGS IN THE
~
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%
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Although the Whit1am Labor Government abandoned its predecessor's
1972/3 ceilings, it did impose limits on APS growth for 1973/4 and 1974/5.
Faced with growing unemployment, the imminence of an election, the need
to cut back programs if the ceiling was to be respected ancl pressure from
it social base, the Labor cabinet discarded the 1974/5 ceiling. Nevertheless,
the 1975, Hayden, budget forshadowed subsequent Liberal-National Country
Party policies. The Fraser government has not suffered from the ALP's
lack of resolve when it comes to unemployment. Where the Labor government
hesitated in directly contributing to unemployment by severely curtailing
the growth of the public service, the conservative government confidently
cut absolute numbers.
Thus far, ceilings have been reached through "natural wastage"
le non-replacement of retiring public servants. On the 30th November, 1976,
however, the government announced legislation design~d to make public servants
"dismissab1e in the interests of efficient and economic utilisation of staffll..
The ~i1l was introduced into Parliament but later withdrawn; it was mooted
again in ;m:id" 1978. The legislation would repeal some of the safeguards
against arbitrary retrenchment in the PSA, but would apply only to the
"early retirement" of people over 55. It is particularly significant. in
areas like Medibank where the government is divesting itself of particular
functions altogether.
;
To the extent that government activities are not curtai1ed,a1ong with
staff numbers, ceilings entail a greater intensity of work for public servants.
That is, the workload of a section remains the same even though it contains
fewer people. In some areas, the Commonwealth Employment Service and
Department of Social Security in particular, the workload has even increased
in absolute terms Ca1 though additional staff have been taken on in these
two instrumenta1ities).
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There have been attacks on other conditions of public service
employment, besides their traditionally greater security. The government
has forshadowed that maternity and paternity leave provisions will be
curtailed. By cutting maternity and abolishing paternity leave and
restricting leave without pay, public servants' intensity of work has been
increased. For a given number of jobs a smaller number of public servants
is now required, because, at a given time, fewer of them are away on leave.
Moreover more women will be forced to leave the service when they give
birth.
The government has passed legislation to ammend the Public Service
Arbitration Act, which a10ws it to stand down public servants. Unlike
provisions in the PSA, which provides for dismissal only in extreme
circumstances, and the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, there
is no right of appeal under the ammended act.
The current wave of work humanisation (job enrichment, worker
participation etc) in Australia and elsewhere has also coincided with
the growing crisis of world capitalism since the late 1960's. In the
terms of orthodox social science:
"One main reason for the trend (to work
humanisation) is that the political, social
and market environments of some large
organisations, and some medium and small ones'131
too, have become less stable and predictable."
The declining productivity and international competitiveness of U.S.
. .' .
m.anufacturi.ng industry, since 1965, placed it under considerable pressure
particularly after traditional work intensification strategies had failed to
. h" 132 W k h " d d h .~mprove t e s~tuat~on. or uman~sat~on was a opte as a new tec n~que
to bolster productivity. A 1970 Fortune article, "Blue collar blues on the
assembly line" and its sequel were a landmark in the popularisation of
awareness of productivity problems and new solutions based on the
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"behavioural sciences. 1I 133subsequently government involvement has
increased. The Department of Health Education and Welfare published its
study Work in America in 1973. In 1974 two bills were Int.roducedrint.o
the US Senate seeking government encouragement of private sector work
humanisation experiments.
Similar developments have occurred in Britain:
In recent years an increasing number of
British managements have shown renewed
interest in 'participation' as a possible
remedy for industrial ills and some have looked'
beyond this to new human relations techniques,
notably to job enrichment.134
In 1973 the Department of Employment published On the Quality
of Work Life. Similarly the EEC assembly recommended the abolition of the
assembly line in 1973. OEeD Minister of Labour resolved in 1976 that
. d 1 h Id ., b . fa' . 135government, unlons an emp oyers s ou pay more attentlon to JO satls actlon.
Other European countries have been experimenting with various forms of
k h . . 136wor umanlsatlon.
In Australia the first of the new wave of initiatives in work
humanisation took place during the late 1960's137 They occurred mainly in
manufacturing industries ego Luv Pet Foods, Alcan, Phi1ips. This is
understandable in the context of the .~ (un- ) competitiveness of the
manufacturing sector. The Jackson Report referred to a "deep-seated and long
standing malaise" in manufacturing apparent as early as 1966. 139 The first
, ~
mention of an operating work humanisation scheme occurs in the Personnel
140Practice Bulletin in 1968. As the trend gathered momentum during the
1970' svar-t i cLeson the new human relations appeared quite frequently. In
1973 large select bibliographies on'job satisfaction and enrichment appeared.
A similar pattern occurs in Rydge's,with articles on work humanisation making
their debut during the early 1970's.
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The main governmental protagonists of work humanisation in
Australia have been the South Australian Labor government and NSW and
Commonwealth governments, both Labor and conservative. 141 In 1973
the South Australian government set up a Unit for the Quality of Work
Life (now Industrial Democracy Unit), in the Department of Labour and
Industry, a similar Unit was established in NSW in 1975. The Liberal-
National Country Partyamp Ioymerrt and industrial relations policy in 1975
included a call for participation and involvement of workers in industry.
The Fraser government's policy on "employee participation" was finally
issued in June 1978. It saw employee participation as including "a range of
methods by which employees take appropriate part in decision making,
such as job redesign, job restructuring, self-managing groups, works
. d . . '1 ,,142Th h h D f Pd' .commIttees an JOInt councl s. roug t e epartment 0 ro UCtlVlty,
the government proposal to encourage, (but not to legislate for) employee
participation by undertaking public relations campaigns, research, training
and a tripartite steering committee. Moreover:
the government will encourage the investigation
by other departments of the viability of
adopting or extending employee participation
principles and practices within their own
organisations '.'143
The Minister of Productivity's accompanying statement explicitly links
employee participation to productivity increases "as potentially complementary
and supporting each other" 144
While it cannot be thoroughly argued here, the fact that job
enrichment and worker participation have been taken up by the Commonwealth,
N.S.W. and South Australian governments is related to the autonomy of
different levels of government, the role of the ALP and the weight of
manufacturing in the s.:tates. N.S.W. and South Australia as well as Victoria,
are the States in which manufacturing is concentrated. Work humanisation
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is a strategy particularly appropriate to labour intensive industries ie
manufacturing rather than mining or rural capitalism in Australia. Given
the Labor Party's working class suppor~ it is particularly in its interests
to promote collaboration in order to achieve economic stability. The
federal government enjoys a greater autonomy from the immediate (though not
long term) interests of the capitalist class, hence the Fraser government"'s
readiness to give verbal support to "emp Ioyee participation"
There is general agreement that the current wave of work humanisation
was prompted by a need to improve productivity by cutting absenteeism, turnover-
rates and minor sabotage on the job. However the explanations for the
relative decline in productivity differ. Orthodox social science and popular
accounts argue that today's "youth" have much higher expectations of the
intrinsic value of their work. This is because they are better educated and
many have been through the consciousness raising of the counter-culture
or student movement. "The central fact about the new workers is that
they are young and bring into the plant with them the new perspectives
of American youth in the 1970' s ~tl46The jobs they find are fragmented,
repetitious and boring. As a consequence there have been increases in
discipline problems, turnover etc. The solution is to make the jobs
more interesting and to involve workers in th~L
The argument is unsatisfactory because it cannot differentiate
between the present situation and developments over the last one hundred
years and more. For thatp:riodeach generation has been successively better
educated and jobs have become increasingly fragmented. Yet the problems
of productivity today are. perceived precisely as something new. The
orthodox explanation suffers from deeper inadequacies: it is based on a
duality between idealism (people's attitudes have changed) ~nd technological
determinism (technology has made jobs more tedious). Social relations
between people are left out.
The move to work humanisation has been prompted by an economic
crisis manifest in falling rates ,.of prof't t Thl s has involved the greater
combativity of the working class of which "changing attitudes" and
productivity problems (turnover etc) are a consequence. Moreover the
direction of technological change is also conditioned by the class struggle
(fragmentation of work increases the potential for management control
over the labour process). Work humanisation is a specific response of
capital, to changed circumstances of class struggle. In the context of
increasing working class combativity, work humanisation is a technique which
may dissipate mi.Li t ancy;: and preempt more effective organi.sat i on, lihen it
is not possible to employ force t o contain the working class . The use
of one technique does not necessarily preclude the use of others - thus
work humanisation, automation and even Tay10rism may occur together.
Australian government departments began to take an interest in
improving the "quality of work life" early in the 1970's.147 At the same
time it was becoming increasingly apparent that the relatively unrestricted
growth in staff numbers would not continue. Although some initiatives had
been conceived of before 1973, the advent of the ALP government gave work
humanisation in the APS a boost. Of the 14 "organisation development"
(0.0.) activities in the APS described in Guy, only one was started before
1972. The work humanisation content in this case, the Department of
Housing and Construction's employment of project teams, was not great.
Organisation development is the current term for work humanisation
in Australia. It is generally defined in terms of its objectives and
methodology. Most accounts attribute twin objectives to 0.0:
"a) increasing the capacity of the system to achieve its goals, and
"b) helping members of the system to attain greater satisfaction of
their personal needs in the course of pursuing the objectives
,,148
of the system.
The methods of 0.0. include job redesign, worker participation, "survey-
feedback" and T groups. Moreover reference is frequently made to the
importance of "behavioural science" in the development of 0.0. proj ects. 149
Perhaps the most enlightening definition of 0.0. for a marxist,
comes from practitioners in the Bureau of Customs:
Organisation development is jargon for a
planned, organisation-wide effort to increase
the organisation's effectiveness and health <in
terms of efficiency and job satisfaction of
employees. The process is managed from the
top, uses planned programs which alter the
organisation's way of doing things and uses
behavioural science~150
This definition is unusual for its candidness about where the control of
0.0. project's lies.
In addition to the activities on individual instrumentalities,
there are overall policies on work huma rlsation, for the whole of the APS.
The most public of these is the government's encouragement of experimentation
in the public service, in its 1978 "Employee Participation" policy. There
are other policies which date back further. Thus, in 1972 and 1973,the
PSB conducted Second Division staff seminars on job .satisfactlon. By
means of a Joint Council report of December 1975, the Board adopted a policy
on job satisfaction. In December 1973 thePSB had proposed that Joint
Council establish a sub-committee on "Job Enrichment and Worker Satisfaction".
TI1e sub-conunittee examined worker participation as well as job enrichment
and reported after consulting with departments. The report and documents
!e~ding to it emphasised' the dual objectives of job satisfaction/productivity:
The Board is concerned to stL~u1ate departmental
interest in the introduction of practices designed
to enhance satisfaction derived by staff from their
jobs while maintaining and perhaps improving existing
efficiency levels". letter from the PSB
Secretary to permanent heads 20th August 1974.
Results of some short-term studies indicate
that improvements in quality and quantity
of work output tend to flow from improvements
in job satisfaction. l S1
Joint Counci1(including union representatives) is explicit about a
community of interest> in work humanisation. Like orthodox accounts of
O.D. it discards any. .not i on that workers and management may have different
interests in the nature of "job satisfaction" schemes:
In pursuing increased job satisfaction within
the Service there is a harmony between the
interests of staff, departmental management
and the community.lS2
The PSB has expressed support for work humanisation in other ways.
tIn 1974 it co~operated with the Coombs Commission in conducting a serVlce~
wide job satisfaction survey. In discussing productivity within the APS,
one PSB Commissioner summed up the thrust of work humanisation:
1) the goals of the organisation are paramount.
2) the task of management is to harmonise the
"apparently conflicting elements" of effective
performance of any goals and individual needs and
.. . d' d" 153aspIratIons, In or er to Increase pro uctlVlty.
CASE STUDIES.
Some of the best known attempts at work humanisation have occurred
in the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).lS4ADP was introduced to the ATO
during the early and mid 1960's and is now central to its functioning. The
late 1960's and early 1970's saw an extensive reappraisal of the workings
of the office, in an effort to increase productivity and take best advantage
of ADP.
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In 1973 the Deputy Commissioners of Taxation were asked to examine
the ways in which the principles of the ~ork in America report (1973) could
be applied to the ATO and to undertake job redesign projects. These
projects have been seen as part of "the normal management process of
streamlining the organisation-especially in terms of greater cost-effectiveness
155 .
of procedures" Generally they have been accompanied by extensive
automation and emphasis on systems analysis, work study and the development
156
of "work management control systems"
The core of 0.0. in theATO have been Executive Conferences. These
are five or six day residential study course~where 25 managers or potential
managers examine modern management methods and specific problems. The
Conferences set the tone for management style and the parameters for 0.0.
projects. There has been very limited staff involvement in the design of
projects.
A variety of approaches to work humanisation have been adopted in
diff~r.ent. Tax offices and. sections. Job enrichment, "teamwork", and
job rotation have been tried. In the Sydney office job enrichment in
clerical processing areas· involved the enlargement and rotation of jobs so
that each worker exersized more skills and the allocation of responsibility,
I
for j:eachingrequired output levels, to groups rather than 'individuals.
Together with reclassifications and revision of methods" this led to:, a
reduction of error rates; improved qua1ity of work; reduced overtime and
fewer staff numbers; and" a relatively high degree of job satisfaction."
Thus there was an increase in productivity. 157
In the assessing section of the Parramatta office, group allocation of
work and job enlargement of work were introduced. The role of the supervisors
was down-played (they "became" expert advisors) and group interaction
emphasized. This project also increased productivity:
It would seem that the group structure
in this section is little more than a
supportive work arrangement designed to
maximise output, the assessors themselves
ac~nowledge the effectiveness of group
pressures toward attainment of group
goals. 158
Similar measures have been introduced for direct data entry workers
(who key information into the computer) and the receiving section at the
Parramatta and other offices. Overall the various schemes in the ATO
seem to have, at least, increased the quality of work and, in/a number of
cases, increased productivity. They have also led to lower absenteeism and
159turnover and a more contented workforce. The senior proponent of 0.0.
in the ATO, Commissioner Lanigan, is now the permanent head of the
Department of Social Security and is introducting similar changes there.
Initiatives involving workers and the redesign of their jobs have
been taken in a number of Departments - Employment and Industrial Relations,
Education, Social Security, Overseas Trade, Police and Customs (these are
their present names). The most comprehensive of these programs occurred in
160· !
the Bureau of Customs. The impetus for change came from senior management,
who decided, in 1973, to establish and 0.0. task-force to stimulate changes.
This was done through "participative design seminars", where members of a
work group, with advice from the task-force, determine the degree of autonomy
(within prescribed limits) they are to exersize on the conduct of their
work. The limits are the overall obj ectives set for the group and the
resources allocated to it for their achievement. By September 1975, 60 work
groups had undertaken the seminars, with varying degrees of success. Emphasis
I
was laid on increasing job satisfaction, while at least maintaining levels of
,
I
productivity. This seems to have been achieved and in some cases productivity
has increased.
e- 56.,.
Survey-feedback techniques have been used in a variety of
government authorities (Department' of Construction, Employment and
Industrial Relations, Police and Customs and the ABC) , as well as a
service-wide project. The technique involves the administration of an
attitude survey which is used, by management or consultants, to identify
problem areas. The results are red back to the workers and attempts are
made to rectify the problems. The decision to establish the a.D. task~force
in the Bureau of Customs was taken after a survey. In the ABC ,a survey
was used as the basis for "action planning groups" (work groups).. which
161
attempted to solve problems identified by the survey.
In addition to the above projects, which entailed the redesign of
jobs and/or involvement of workers in decisions on the office floor, worker
participation schemes, at a higher level, have been introduced in some
departments. A joint consultative council was set up in the Department
of Employment and Industrial Relations (then Labour and Immigration)
in 1975. A staff Participation Review Group, in the Department of Environment,
Housing and Community Development, recommended, in September 1977, that a
Staff Conference of all Department employees should be set up and that there
should be staff representatives on the Departmental Management and Policy
C .\ommlttees. This kind of development is quite similar to the joint consultation
of the 1950's and also resembles "co-determination" in Europe.
In September 1978 the Fraser government announced that there would no
longer be a staff elected Commissioner for the ABC. The government thus
reversed a decision of its L.abor predecessor. This raises the question of
whether the wave of work humanisation is already subsiding and if it was
just a manifestation of the ALP's period in office. Certainly work
humanisation received a boost during the Labor government and the concepts of
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0.0. fitted in well into technocratic, liberal aspects of Labor's ideology.162
However, the Liberal-National Country Party government has encouraged
"employee participation". The reorientation of the Human Relations section
of the Department of Productivity to that policy is likely to promote further
experimentation with 0.0. So long as there is no. dramatic increase in
industrial confrontation in th~ APS (or generally) work humanisation
developments are likely to continue ..
Public service trade unions have not expressed a great deal of interest
in work humanisation policies. Both APSA and ACOA had a hand in the
Joint Council report on job enrichment as they have representatives, through
CAGEO on the Council. In addition~CAGEO has adopted a policy which
emphasizes the role of unions in advocating "industrial democracy" and
their right to appoint union representatives to participative bodies. While
the policy affirms that workers should be involved in the development and
implementation of industrial democracy schemes, it ca l l.s on political parties
and the government to "facilitate" their introduction. In May 1974 the
Council of Commonwealth Public Service Organisations (CAGEO's predecessor)
held a conference on "Worker Participation and the Quality of Work Life".
The 1974 Conference of ACOA resolved, similarly, that:
The Association supports the concepts of
worker participation in the management of
the Australian Public Service and to achieve r ,
this urges the Public Service Board and·
departments to actively pursue a policy.
of greater development of responsibility at
subordinate levels, and the physical
decentralisation of departmen~.163
A discussion paper on work humanisation was circulated in ACOA during
1976 although it has not led to any additional policies. APSA has a policy
on "industrial democracy" by virtue of its membership of CAGEO. The APSA
Review has, however expressed support for work humanisation: "Our
. I
association believes it should have an active role in encouraging worker
participation and creating more satisfying, interesting and challenging
. b 164JO s ,
In practice the policies of the APSA and ACOA have meant very little
besides giving legitimacy to management initiated work humanisation schemes.
Where individual union members have taken initiatives ACOA has to some
extent backed them up. Thus the Section Committee (like a blue collar
union I s shop committee) in the then Department of Labour and Immigration
supported changes proposed bya member. there in 1973 and 1974. The
NSW Branch of ACOA:gave its imprimatur in 1978 to a Department of
Productivity Section Committee proposal for participation in the management
of its department. ACOA sent an organiser to the Parrarnatta Taxation office
in March 1977, in response to objections hy an APSA/ACOA/FCU (Federated
Clerks Union) 1iason committee to the structure of a management initiated
employee advisory committee. The objections were that the committee had no
constitution or terms of reference; members of the committee were not
..
elected by the whole staff and there was no provision for union representation.
ACOA claimed victory because the committee I s minutes were to be sent to the
. , f'f i 165 A . 1 . Wh' C 11 . 166 f' h .unl0n s 0 lce. n artlc e ln lte 0 ar re errlng to t e Taxatl0n-_...:..:.--:;.----=.=..~
Office experience, warned against the dangers of worker participation committees
usurping the role of unions or helping to legitimise the introduction of
new technology.
Marxists have adopted different perspectives on the significance of
work humanisation schemes. The differences relate, primarily, to the
implications of work humanisation for working class, socialist strategy.
There is a general agreement as to its underlying causes. Thus the current
crisis of capitalism has spurred rttempts to increase the rate of surplus
value and to redistribute surplus value (from the public to the private
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sectors). Work humanisation is appropriate to such developments because
it increases productivity by reducing absenteeism and turnover; it may
also increase quality and quantity of output. Moreover, to the extent
that workers are more "satisfied" and concerned with theUintrinsic value"
of their work they will be less inclined to industrial militancy over wages:
Hopefully also, both staff associations
and management will increasingly give
recognition to the importance of rewards
(~otivatbrs).other_than.wages and
conditions .167
Work humanisation increases the legitimacy of capitalist relations
of production by involving workers in decision making and using. "group
" 1 duct i h h 1 .. 168norms to regu ate pro tl0n, rat er t an c ose supervlslon:
Provided we have a group and not just a
collection of individuals or a mob, and
that group has accepted responsibility
for a group task, then it will seek to
make its life easier (or more productive
for ~its· ends) by ... allocating tasks
and other rewards and punishments to
to control what they consider to be a
fair contribution by members. 169
The first marxist school of thoughybn work humanisation includes a
French and US170and an English current. 171The first current argues that work
humanisation has been forced onto employers by the working class, in that
it is designed to overcome manifestations of worker discontent. The
"democr at i.sat i onuof the workplace" is inherently dangerous for capitalists
because "given a taste of control over'their work, workers will go after more~:2
The English current, around the Institute for Workers Control, regards
the struggle for workers' control as the central focus for the transformation
of society. This has entailed an endorsement of demands for worker
representatives on boards, in the belief that they can lead to more radical
. 173demand~ and a faith in the Labour Party to implement desirable changes.
Both currents see changes in the direction of work humanisation as prefiguring
.,.60.,.
a.dramatic transformation of capitalist relations of production. They
stare an essentially favourable and optimistic attitude to work humanisation
in general.
Th d h174 k h . . . 1 .,.e secon approac to wor uman1sat1on 1S ess opt1m1st1c.
emphasizes the conditions surrounding the introduction of schemes-vs
It
"as with any reform, the meaning of new non-despotic forms of work organisation
d d h 1 , f f 'd'· h" d .. b 175epen s on t e re at10n 0 orces pres1 1ng over t e1r 1ntro uct1on.
Thus, if initiated by management.. work humanisation can lead t.o .a greater
integration of workers, acceptance of the structure of the (capitalist)
labour process and legitimation of the "goals" the "organisation" has set.
Thus the ideological hegemony of capital within the WQrK ~lace will be
enhanced (with or without an increase in the appropriation of surplus value/
labour). If changes are not initiated by workers themselves, there is no
great 1iklihood that they will feel confident in posing real alternatives
for the organisation of production. Nichols (1975) has pointed out that,
if work humanisation schemes are to be radica~ising, an alternative to
private capitalist production has to be demonstrated to worker~ by their
more class conscious colleagues. There is no necessary existential leap
from complacency to a workers' control perspective when, eg a job
enrichment scheme is introduced, Hence the importance of a strong shop
floor/trade union organisation. Where workers have taken the initiative in
J .
implementing their own democratic forms of organisation (as opposed to
changes theorised within the management ideOlogy of work humanisation/
behavioural science) in the factory (shop committees, Italian Comitati
Unitari di Base) or exerting their own autonomy (control over the pace of
d . ) h' d " 1 176 ,pro uct10n management as reslste strong y. Management reSIstance
has even gone as far as the establishment of alternative mechanisms of
\
participation, involving management and union officials in order to by-pass
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the militancy on the shop floor.
The third approach to work humanisation dismiss\-'l~ it out of hand as
J
class collaboration. To the extent that this approach neglects the
particular circumstances and relation of class forces in which work
humanisationschmemes are introduced it shares the inadequacies of the
first, reformist, approach.
The way in which work humanisation has been used by management has
been labelled neo-Tayl orl.st, rather than anti-Taylorist by de NorrtmoulIdn 178
and Palloix. The key features of Taylorism are shared by neo-Taylorism.
Both assume:
a) rationalism: the methodology of both is "scientific (see below).
b) that there is an underlying harmony of interests between managers
and workers ie an implicit denial of class.
c) that high productivity is a valid goal in itself and is beneficial for
everyone.
d) individualism, in focusing on the needs of individuals and the nature of
individual tasks, thus leaving out the collective worker. 179
e) the division of labour. Taylorism entails the increased fragmentation of
jobs, while neo-Taylorism entails the acceptance of a hierarchical
division of labour, notably the separation of conception from execution.
Thus semi-autonomous work groups are generally made up of workers at the
same level in the hierarchy; proj ect ,&roups retain an internal hierarchy. 180
Work humanisation in the APS has generally occurred in the form of
0.0. as defined by the Bureau of Customs (above) ie managed from the top
down. The critique of the second marxist approach is therefore applicable.
There are some cases where t'hird division officers, in the class 6-8 range,
professionally interested in 0.0. (sociologists, training officers~ have
made the first move. Thus in the Department of Employment,and Industrial Relatlons
(DEIR)
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(formerly Labour and Immigration) a "dissatisfied" class 7 sociologist
11 d · t' b t th l't of work ll'fe. 181ca e mee lngs a ou e qua 1 y Those who attended
were mainly third division officers, some quite senior. With the support
of the ACOA Section Committee a task force (4 elected, 2 management
t to
representatives) was set up examine problems through a survey. The main
problems identified were: lack of communications and distrust of assessment
and promotions procedures. ' The Section Committee proposed that there be
staff representatives at First Assistant Secretaries meetings (as in
Department of Urban and Regional Development) At this stage, management
-
appropriated the initiative. A joint consultative council was set up
and the Department's ~rking Environment Division made responsible for
changes to increase satisfaction and efficiency. An 0.0, seminar was
arranged for top management. The Acting Secretary concluded, from the
Department's experience, that management had been ill-prepared and that
management committment (ie. control over initiatives from the start) was a
necessary pre-requisite for productive change from the task force and
182
survey,
In the Department of Productivity Sydney office moves towards worker
participation were started by two officers in the Human Relations Branch,
which is responsible for the government's "employee participation" policy.
Both were committed to 0.0, They produced a discussion paper, with ACOA
"backing, A Departmental joint crnmnittee was set up to investigate the
proposals. Management thus took the initiative and this was confirmed
\
when one of the two officers, who had been on the committee, resigned to
avoid possible role conflict (representative of ACOA members/Departmental
0.0. advisor).
In the above two cases staff" rather than management", took initiatives
in the area of the nature of work relations. However, the initiatives were
within the framework of the ideology of work humanisation (as opposed to
a class perspective) and the staff involved were probablyrniddle class
rather than proletarian (in terms of the jobs they filled). Therefore it
was not difficult for management to appropriate the initiative and ensure
that it did not consitutea challenge to its perogatives.
The above analysis raises the question of how work humanisation
actually operates as a management tool. The experience of projects
ini tiated by workers, but within the hegemonic ideological framework; suggests
that an examination of the ideologies which justify C.D., and especially the
"behavioural sciences" may provide an answer.
Braverman has pointed out the importance of an aura of.science to
the effectiveness of Taylorism:
(sc~entific_manag~ment) enters the workplace
not as the representative of science, but
as the representative of management masquerading
in the trappings of sc"ience.183
Ergonomics/work study actually speed up the production process because
workers and its practitioners actually accept the legitimacy and neutrality
of its methods and hence its conclusions. The "trappings of science" are
mathematical techniques, work "standards" (this applies to public .service
establishments pract i ce too) and outside consultants with "specialist
expertise".
The Taylorist approach continues to be employed, but it suffers from
a lack of depth. Despite all its frills it is essentially a "practi.ca l
It?4
ideology" without any coherent, theoretical rationale. With the rise of
the "human relations" school in the 1930' s , the manipulation of people at
work came to be justified not only by a practical but also a theoretical
ideology, whose legitimacy derived from its origins outside the factory, in
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academic institution~ as well as its acceptance by the controllers of the
labour process. Behavioural sciences are thus amp~~ effective prop for
the problematic goals and organisation of production and a more potent
ideological counter to working class pressur~ than older management
practices dressed up as science: Social science research in industry is
"not just an attempt to modify work practices. Increasingly obviously,
it is alsQ an attempt to pre-empt and counter trade unionism and ultimately
"185politics within the industrial working class. We could add that social
(behavioural) science plays the same role in the clerical working class.
The class nature of the present wave of work humanisation is indicated
by the fact that it is the application of theories developed some time ago.
Thus the ideas of Herzberg, Maslaw, McGregor and the Tavistock Institute
(socio-technical systems) had academic currency during the 1950's and 1960's,
but have only been taken up by managers since the late 1960' s . That is,
the present crisis and intensification of class struggle have given the
theories a practical reality, as management tools.
The theories being applied in Australia were elaborated in the U.S .A.
and Britain. Perhaps the greatest intellectual boost to work humanisation
in Australia were the establishment in 1969 of the Centre for Continuing
Educatio~ at the Australian Nationa1Universit~and of the Productivity
Promotion Council/which has popularised ideas similar to those pushed by
~the Centre. Since 1969 some members of the Centre have been propagandising
the socio-technical systems theories elaborated at the Tavi.s t ockTns t.Ltute,
since the late 1950' s and first applied in Norway during the mid~1960's ,
Between 1970 and 1976 the Centre conducted 20 human resources development
workshops. Fred Emergy, on the staff of the Centre was involved in both
the Tavistock Institute and the Norwegian experiments. 186
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He has been influential in Australia and has advisedan O.D. in the
Customs Bureau and Department of Overseas Trade. A number of other
academics have also played significant roles as O.D. consultants to public
service institutions, eg Dexter Dumphy (University of NSW) and John Hunt
"'
(now Macquarie University), Members of the Human Relations section of
the Department of Productivity (formerly in DEIR) popularised O.D.
through the Department's journal, Work and People and other publications
, 1 d' h f h Pd" P . C '1 187lnc u lng t ose 0 t e ro UCtlVlty romotlon ounCl .
The instigators and observers of work humanisation in ,the APS
have emphasized the importance of "behavioural science,,~.88 Not only
does behavioural science inform the activities of management" in
introducing organisational change, but the workers affected are also
introduced to its concepts. Thus the problems experienced by workers
. 189
are experienced through an ideological grid, pravided by management.
The O.D. taskforce in Customs and consultants in the ATO undertook the
, 190
education of workers in the relevant behavioural science theory.
More sophisticated techniques, than merely propagandising ,behavioural
science ideas, have been adopted in some Departments (Education, Overseas
Trade, Customs, Social Security). The approach involves work groups in
seminars or discussions, with a "facilitator" skilled in O.D. In Customs
they were based on Emery and Emery's participative design seminars.
Tltere were four stages:
~ .
1) introduction of the group to job satisfaction and democratisation
concepts, That is the "expert" set the theoretical framework for the
exercise.
2) introduction to the techniques of job design ie the expert defines
the options available.
3) a design session, "where the group decides if it wants to take up the
.- ~9nsc.tQllsness·,
In-maninubab le
- .~
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the options offer~d. ,.bearing in mind that they must meet the
. .11191.department's Ob]ectlves. le workers are offered the kind of choice
typical of capitalism - between fixed and predetermined alternatives -
without being able to question the validity of cons t.radrrtssp Iaced
on them eg Departmental function and the required output of the group.
4) a feedback session where the expert helps sort out problems ie an
attempt to avoid having the ideology undermined by practical difficulties,
by defining them) too, in terms of behavioural science.
"Participation design seminars" could be described as (false) consciousness
raising groups. Coupled with behavioural science they are a means of
encouraging acceptanceiof the status quo of capitalist work relations.
'The use of surveys can also be an effective means for the establishment
of the legitimacy of management control. Conducted by management. they can
be used to appropriate workers' discontent:
The attitude survey is, inherently, an
attempt to atomise human consciousness,
to dissolve it into a mass of individual ':1'.
in order to reconstruct it
forms 192
Furthermore, surveys are important in establishing the scientificity
of 0.0. (~nd the behavioural sciences) by creating supposedly objective
evidence. They define the sources of discontent in tetms of the designer's
I
concepts. TI1US surveys may provide the alternative: pJy, conditions, work
I
group, supervisor, as sources of disatisfaction>but are unlikely to include
"capitalist relations of production" or even, less loaded, terms for the
status quo of domination and subordination at work.
The above analysi~ is not meant to suggest that behavioural sciences
and 0.0. have no basis in reality and are pure duplicity. On the contrary,
they effectively represent the material interests of management ie control
I
over production and profit maximisation:
what others would call their'ideo1ogy'
managers call 'commonsense'193
In order to function effectively those in control of the labour process have
to understand the real (class) relations of work, but in a way which helps
to maintain them, not one which puts them in question. 194 As we have
seen above, both marxism and behavioural sciences offer explanations of .the
smne phenomena in the workp1ace ego absenteeism etc, the effects of
work humanisation. Their practical objects are the same. It is not only
intellectually unen1ightening and unsatisfying to offer them equal
(scientific) status~ as Therborn does, it also avoids political questions
which should be confronted before a useful analysis can begin. 19+ A
;
PART THREE ~ PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEE ORGANISATION
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CHAPTER 6
PUBLIC SERVICE, WORKERS AND SOCIALISM
The origins of APSA and ACOA go back to before World War L The
Federal Public Service Assistants' Association (now APSA) was founded
in 1914, the Commonwealth Public Service Clerical Association (now ACOA)
in 1913. Tabl.esP and lO show their membership from 1948 to 1977. The
.>
growth pattern of both can be fitted into roughly the same periods.
TABLE 8 Eeriods of. union growth
%annual average change
APSA ACOA
period. % annual av. growth. period. % annual av. growth.
1948-77 5.9. 1948-77 5.2
1946-47 58.8 1948-54 7.8
1947-62 <0.2 1954-62 2.7
1962-75 14.3 1962-75 7.2
1975-77 - 4.3 1975-77 2.0
Sources: Tables 9 and 10
During the mid-1940's, the membership of both unions grew quite
rapidly~ This growth was sustained by ACOA until 1953. The second period
of relative stagnation coincides with a down turn in militancy,. as a
consequence of the ruling class offensive of the late 1940's and early
1950's and the subsequent splits in the labour movement. Communists were
excluded from holding office in APSA and ACOA in 1948 and 1949;195t he
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TABLE 9 APSA (FDO) MEMBERSHIP 1946- 1977
Year. Males. Females. Persons annual % increase.
1946 1266 4234 5500
7 1929 6807 8736 58.8
8 2303 6653 8956 2.5
9 -.5 annual
average
50 2141 6718 8859 -.5
1 2217 6525 8742 -1.3
2 2134 6077 8211 -6.1
3 2203 5835 8038 ";2.1
-,
4 2254 5914 8168 1.6
5 2523 5732 8255 -_1.1.
6 2596 5373 7969 -4.6
7 2624 5337 7961 -0.1
8 2744- 5375 8119 2.0
9 3085 5535 8620 6.2
-; 19,60 3188 5498 8686 0.8
1 3125 5320 8445 -2.8
2 3211 5241 8452 0.1
3 3621 5578 9199 8.8.
4 3599 5628 9227 0.3
5 3636 5694 9330 1.1.
6 3688 5600 9288 -0.4
7 4434 5819 10253 ~_10 .4
8 4852 6045 10897 6.3.
9 5311 5667 10978 0.7
1970 5836 6362 12198 11. 1 ~
1 6259 7365 13624 11.7
2 10953 14193 25146 84.6
3 14540 21252 35792 42.3
J4 15918 22461 38379 7.2.
5 13961 24955 38916 1.3
6 13031 23960 36991 -4.9
7 12787 22773 35560 -3.7
Source: APSA Federal Office.
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TABLE 10 - ACOA MEMBERSHIP 1948-1977
Year. Persons. annual % increase.
1948 11041
9 11919 8.2
1950 12944
.... :,:1J:~.5,,'
1 14301 10.5 '.
---...,.
2 15009 5.0
3 15856 5.6
4 16137 1.8
5 16543 2.5
6 16964 2.5
7 17920 5.6
8 2.9 annual
9 18971 2.9 average.
1960 19452 2.5
1 19810 1.8
3 21200 4.9.
4 22158 4.5
5 23119 4.3
6 24257 4.9
7 25482 .5 '.1
8 26163 2.7
9 28942 10.6
1970 30444 5.2
1 32703 7.4
2 38226 16.9
~
3 44655 16.8
4 46748 4.6
5 48782 4.4
6 48198
-1.2
7 47691
-1.1
Source: ACOA Journal and ACOA Federal office.
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the late 1950's saw conflict in the two unions between factions associated
196
with the DLP and mainstream Labor. The staff ceilings of the early
1950's also help to explain the trends in their memberships. The way in
which the ceilings were applied affected APSA and ACOA differently. While
the total number of APS employees fell between 1951 and 1954, the number
of permanent staff increased. ACOA covered only permanent staff, APSA
also covered temporaries, who were a majority of the Fourth division in
1950,197 Not only did the' APSA lose potential members through .redundancfes "
but the sight of members being dismissed was also bad advertising for the
union.
Thethitd.i period, of more rapid growth, was associated with the union
..:.
movement s increased militancy and "white collar" un i ons" greater pneparedness
to behave 198like' their "blue collar" counterparts. Growth in APS
"
employment also accelerated during the mid-1960's. The massive jump in
APSA and ACOA membership between 1971 and 1973 is largely due to the prospects
and advent of the Labor Government in 1972. The shadow Minister for Labour,
Clyde Cameron had indicated that the ALP would introduce improved conditions
for public servants-maternity and paternity leave, a fourth week's annual
Ieavez - but only to those who belonged to trade unions. Public service
.'H
trade unions publicised this policy. The Labot government did attempt to
implement i~ but the policy was disallowed in Arbitration. However, the
~
government gave the unions an advantage, by allowing dues to be deducted from
salaries and forwarded directly to them. Such a practice had a long standing
in the Victorian and NSW public services as well as areas of private industry.
The trend in the present period, 1975 on, is due to staff ceilings.
Public servants, including members of unions, who retire are not replaced.
The union's lack of success in withstanding the attrition of their members'
wages and conditions is also unlikely to attract new members.
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The influence of elements associated with the National Civic Council/
DLP has been strong in ACOAa,ndAPSA at various times, particularly in the
Victorian Brances and Federal Offices. Despite the industrial policies
of the "Groupers", the unions have developed their trade union functions
since the late 1940' 5, when reprinted articles of "professional interest",
by the Chairman of the PSB,199 the Institute of Public Aff~i.rs20gtt,
appeared in the Federal Public Service Journal ~The APSA Review still
reprints second reading speeches by Minister~ on legislation affecting
201. d A A . f h 1public servants, but APSA an CO now conceive 0 t emse ves as
industrial organisations primarily concerned with the wages and conditions
of their members:
Recent years have seen the recognition
of public sector employees being no
different from their private sector
counterparts. 202
Thus ACOA maintains an industrial office of ten staff in Melbourne
(its Federal Office isin.Sydn~Y).APSAhas a smaller industrial staff, having
employed its first research officer as late as 1972. In 1978 an ACOA
plebescite approved affiliation to the ACtU and the NSW Branch decided to
affiliate to the NSW Trades and Labour Council. The 1970's have seen an
. ,
increased willingness of ACOA and APSA members to take industrial action: in
January 1977 Northern Territory public servants struck over proposed
reductions in their remote locality allowances; ACOA members imposed bans
in the Department of Social Security in May 1977 over staff ceilings;
September 1977 saw APSA bans in theATO and Department of Social Security, over
work procedures. APSA and ACOA m~nbers took action in the Commonwealth
Employment Service (CESt over the right to appeal against outside appointments~
in January and February 1978; early in 1978 APSA members at Tullamarine airport
imposed han~,over staff ceilings.
-73-
Another indicator of a growing industrial orientation .:»on.cthe-part of
members of the APS, is the emergence of groupings inside APSA and ACOA
calling for more militant policies. The ACOA Reform Group (RG) was
established in Victoria during 1976; the Government Employee Action
Group (GEAG) was set up in Sydney in April 1978, to work inside ACOA .and
APSA.
Pou1antzas' allocation of third and fourth division workers in the
APS to the new petty bourgeoisie (even if for the wrong reasons) may have had
some descriptive value during the 1940's and 1950's. Now even this
justification is gone, APSA and ACOA members have been behaving increasingly
like members of the traditional "blue collar" working class. This is
not to say that APSA and ACOA are completely effective as trade unions, only
that their limitations are those of many working class, industrial organisations,
especially ones operating within bureaucratic labour processes. The most
significant of these limitations will be briefly discussed:
1. One of the most important restrictions on the effectiveness of trade
unions in the APS is the sectional ism of the present union structure. Instead
of being united in the face of a single emp1oye~Austra1ianpublic servants
are divided into a large number of union~ which may see themselves as having
.' divergent interests. This is a consequence of the reproduction cif the
bureaucratic structure of the pub lic service labour process, enshrined in
the system of classifications and designations, in the union movement. Thus
technical designations are divided from clerical ones (Professional Officers
Association; Australian Public Service Artisans' Association (APSAA) and
various unions with a majority of members outside the APS (eg Electrical
Trades Union, Metal Workers' Union, Transport Workers Union) as against
ACOA and APSA (the Federated Clerks' Union, with a m~jority of members outside
the APS, also covers some third and fourth division clerical workers).
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Further, clerical workers are divided between fourth division, APSA, and
third and second divisions, ACOA. The fragmentation of clerical workers
is exacerbated by the union of members of the working class (lower third
division) with members of the ruling class (at least the tqp of the second
division) in the same association,
The policies of the APSA and ACOA reproduce the problems of
fragmentation. ACOA has traditionally been strongly in favour of the
rentention of the divisional structure and higher educational standards,
for admission to the third division. 203APSA is formally opposed to the
d ' .. 1 204b l'f' d k 1 d d f hlVlSlona structure, ut wants overqua 1 le wor ers exc u e rom t e
fourth division,20S The Royal Commission into Australian Government
Administration recommended the abolition of div i s i.on.s jbut this has not
been implemented, probably because, in an eGonomic crisis, under a conservative
governmens,. illusions of division in.the working class are a more effective
means of demobilising discontent than possible illusions of increased
b i l i 206mo 1 lty.
The effects of fragmentation became apparent in the CES dispute of
January and February 1978. APSA withdrew support for the bans when the
government agreed toallbw fourth division officers to apply for the positions
in question, even though the right of appeal, with which ACOA members had
been concerned, was not granted, The ACOA members were thus, {solated;"
because the government could take advantage of union fragmentation.
There have been some recent developments to overcome union
fragmentation, The APSA and APSAA started a process of amalgamation in 1977,
RG and GEAG have called for the abolition of the divisional structure and
h 1 ' f h . 207t e ama gamatlon 0 t e two unIons.
2, In pursuing their aims APSA and ACOA have generally accepted the
.framework of Public Service Arbitration, negotiation with the PSB and the
classifications system. The unions' leadershi~,see industrial action
as a technique for ensuring that management negotiates with them rather
than as a means for involving the membership in decision making within
the union. The most militant actions, such as the Tullamarine, Social
Securtiy and CES disputes, were initiated by the rank and ~ile. In
the latter two cases the union leadership opposed their continuation
once a union/management consultation mechanism and a case with the
Public Service Arbitrator had been forshadowed.
The unions make challenges to the classifications of particular
positions eg word processor operators, but the overall bureaucratic hierarchy
is accepted. APSA seeks the expansion of clerical assistant grade 4 and
above classifications, to improve "career prospects". ACOA wants a renaming
of second and third division classifications. As indicated in Part I, the
proliferation of classification categories serves to divide workers by making
spuriously fine distinctions in authority levels and perpetuating the
ideology of a "career service".· Only GEAG has gone as far as demanding
the "complete abolition of all divisions, classes, grades and levels",209
pointing out that the pyramidal structure of the APS means that only a small
proportion of public service workers will ever get jobs above clerk class 4.
3. In concentrating on arbitration and negotiation with the PSB, APSA
and ACOA leaders have neglected involving members in matters that affect
them. Thus stop work meetings are regarded as a sanction against management
and their important role in informing and mobilising members is discounted.
At the NSW ACOA Branch Council meeting on October 17, 1978, the Branch
Secretary announced that there would be 600 redundancies in Medibank and
that ACOA had done all it could, in negotiating with employing authority
to save jobs. There was no mention of;fndustrial action. ACOA was, however,
210trying to get a preference clause inserted into the appropriate award.
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APSA imposed bans on word processors in the ATO and Department of
Social Securit~ in order to force management to negotiate. The union's
approach to Automation works on a 'top-down' basis. Members are expected
tOJreport to union officials in order to make their negotiations with
management more effective, rather than officials reporting to members in
order to strengthen their organisation on the office floor. This means
that "reasonable demands" are determined by union officials and management,
rather than the workers directly affected.
The unions' approaches to worker participation betray a sDhilar:'
orientation to the powers that be. They consist of demands on the PSB
and management for "consultative machinery" and involvement rather than the
establishment of office floor organisation with enough muscle to wrest some
control over the labour process from management.
4. As in many other unions, continuous contact with employers has tended
to separate full-time officials of APSA and AC,OA from the membership. In
ACOA this has led to quite spectacular consequences, with a series of senior
officials being transformed in respresentatives of the employing authority. 211
The problem of divisions between members and- o£fice~s is cqmpounded by_ a
variety of electoral procedures. ACOA representatives on Promotions Appeals
Committees and Boards and to CAGEO (Council of Australian Government"
Employees Organisation) are elected by Branch Councils, rather than the
membership.212 If elected twice, consecutively, to a position, APSA,Branch
Officers hold it for three years rather than one. 213Bot h ACOA and APSA
provide for committees of members working in the same area - "section" and
"sectional" committees. ACOA's section committees form a more effective
step between members and officers than APSA's sectional committees eg there
are over 20 section committees in Sydney but less than 5 sectional Committees.
A discussion paper, instigated by ACOA's Federal leadership and circulated
in September 1978 proposed that the role of section committees should be
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expanded. The paper did not, however, consider the inadequacies of
triennial elections for the committees. In response l GEAG proposed that
section committees be made up of delegates, subject to recall. 214
5., APSA and ACOA have been reluctant to become involved in social issues,
which do not directly affect their members conditions of employment.
ACOA has stated that it will direct its members not;'td expedi.a.te the
activities of the Industrial Relations Bureau if it initiates legal
action against unions. However, the Bureau constitutes a particular
threat to public service unions, given the prohibition on strikes in the
PSA. APSA, while expressing concern over government policies which
adversely affect the public has not seen action over th~m as appropriate. 215
RG has taken up the issues of Medibank,Media Policy and the Trade Practices
Act. 216 GEAG has questioned the practice~which public servants are forced
to implement, especially in relation to the treatment of the unemployed by
the CES and Department of Social Security, and the ideologies which support
th 217em.
ACOA,particu1ar1y since its 1977 Federal elections I has tended to
be more active and militant than APSA. This is apparent in ACOA's affiliation
to the ACTU, a greater readiness to take industrial action and its own
developed policies on a variety of issues eg worker participation, child
care, discrimination and a more effective office floor organisation. There
are a number of reasons for this apparent paradox (lower paid workers less
militant than better paid ones):
1) APSA's membership is ·more transient than ACOA's. 38% of the fourth
division had less than five years of service in 1976,'whi1e the figure for
the third division was 24%.218 Fourth division workers have a higher
219 .turnover rate and lower promotion prospects. These aspects of the
behaviour of members of the fourth division and the fact that a majority
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of APSA members are women reflect the location of their jobs, in one
of the lowest segments of the working class ie the nature of the jobs means
that the least organised elements of the working class are recruited to
them, which means that poor working conditions are less likely to be changed.
2) .Other unions which have members in the fourth· division' cover those
workers more likely to be mili t.ant; ;,skilled manual workers tend to belong
to outside unions; militant clerical workers in the Postal Commission are
covered by the Postal Clerks' and Telegraphists' Union
3) APSA dues are lower than ACOA'~, reflecting its members' lower pay.
4) APSA can achieve some gains and adopt policies by tailing ACOA and
CAGEO, given the bureaucratic organisation of management/union relations and
"fl ow-ons"
The analysis in Part I of the thesis led to the conclusion that the
internal structures of the contemporary state Ca labour process defining
the relations between antagonistic classes) constitutes it as a capitalist
state. Some of the mechanisms, which maintain the state's internal structure,
and union responses to them were examined in Part II. Thus far, Part III
has confirmed that the organisations of public service workers, APSA and
ACOA have been behaving increasingly like other trade unions. Recently,
and GEAG have played a role in criticising and radicalising the two public
service trade unions under consideration.
Given that the R.G. and GEAG have been attempting to push ACOA and
APSA politics to the left, do their approaches provide a viable strategy
for socialist activity in the APS? The perspectives of the two groups are
not identical. Although they share a number of policies - on child care,
union democratisation, amalgamation, wage increases - there are important
di ff 2201 erences .
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RG's approach to changing ACOA has emphasized the importance of
elections. The union's problem has been largely perceived as its inadequate
and undemocratic leaders:
ACOA Reform Group will continue until the
union's constitution and officials ensure 221
that the union is controlled by its membery
The problem can be overcome .by co-ordinating opposition to the
leadership, running election campaigns and pointing out when officials
are out of step with the rank and file. 222This entails the involvement
of union member~ both in the union and the Reform Group, and providing them
with a voice through Alternative Viewpoint (the ;~froug':s' newsletter). GEAG
regards rank and file activity as an end in itself, as well as a means of
changing union policy and leaders. Elections are a tactic but not necessarily
223
,the key one. Where R.G. calls for dissent to be expressed electorally and
through union channels, GEAG has emphasized the importance of public service
k .... . h 1 224 d d f d he i .wor ers lnltlatlng actlon t emse ves, ln or er to e en t elr lnterests
without waiting for the union to change its policies. If activity on the
office floor, to advance their ends, becomes widely accepted by workers,
challenging managerial control over the labour process becomes a possibility.
Without an active rank and file, no radical union policies or leadership can
al ter the day to day re l atLons. of domination and subordination in the
workplace. The differance between R.e.;. 's and GEAG's attitudes to the role
of trade union leaders is encapulated in GEAG's call for limited tenure of
union office, as opposed to R.G. 's silence on the issue.
The ·R~form Group's perspective of changing ACOA's leadership is reflected
in its own structure, as a group operating inside on.e union. Alternative
Viewpoint is aimed exclusively at ACOA members, even though Victorian APSA
members are facing a leadership very similar to ACOA's. An attempt during
1977 to get an opposition group off the ground, inside APSA, fail~d.225
It received no support in Alternative Viewpoint, On the other hand
GEAG, which supports the same amalgamation policies as RG, includes members
of both unions. GEAG's newsletter, Grey Collar, is directed at APSA and
ACOA members. Thus, in its own structure, it furthers its policy on
industrial unionism and promotes the unified organisation of all public
servants in the same workplace.
Both GEAG and RG have drawn attention to wider social issues, notably
, 226
uranium mining and Medibank . However, Grey Collar has also challenged
the legitimacy of the policies which public service workers implement on a
. b . . 11 hI' 1 b f' 227routlne aS1S, especla y tose re atlng to unemp oyment ene ltS.
As public servants we should fight for the
rights of all people. We much unite, resist
and refuse to be part of any attacks on
working people.228
T his approach challenges the ideology of public service neutrality which plays
an important role in separating public service workers from the rest of the
working class (see chapter 3). It poses the question of class unity.
GEAG's awareness of issues of a wider, class, significance extends to other
policies. In the first issue of Grey Collar, GEAG accepted the same policy
on permanent part-time employment as RG, which was subsequently adopted
by ·AEOA's 1~77 Conference·The policy advocates permanent part time
employment if leave, seniori"tY"and s'(ipe:rannua~ation cond.i.t i.onss ar-e guara~t~~~.
In Grey Collar 6 GEAG's policy was modified in light of the economic climate
in which permanent part-time employment might be introduced:
CouId PPTE (permanent part-time' employment)
be their subtle way of reducing our wage
l~vels even more effectiv~ly than wage
indexation has done? .. Howmany people
would there be in our society who could 230
afford to live on half their present income?
The article concludes that ACOA should lend its support to the campaig~of
other unions for a shorter working week without loss of pay.
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The difference between RG and GEAG on worker participation is
analogous. The former has called on the PSB to introduce work humanisation
231
schemes, in a way similar to ACOA and CAGEO policy. GEAG has expressed
more scepticism about worker part i.cspatLon:
Everyone working in such conditions should
look at what they have gained, and at what
management has gained.232
From the above outline it emerges that the implicit program of
RG has been a militant unionism, based ona democratisation of ACOAand
a more aggressive attitude to management. RG has had some success in pushing
ACOA in this direction, however such a pr~ramtakes the limitations of the
capitalist labour process as given. But "What (is) essential, from the
socialist viewpoint, (is) that the transitional nature of trade union
'legality' should be recognised".233That is, revolutionary union activity
works towards challenging management control over the labour process,
through the establishment of 'dual power' on the factory or office floor. 234
GEAG does allow for an eventual transcendence of "trade union consciousness"
by a revolutionary class consciousness, in its emphasis on the validity of
rank and file action and questioning of the legitimacy of management
ideologies ("career s erv i ce'", public service neutrality). . Perhaps for
the first time in the APS, GEAG is raising the possibility of a socialist
organisation of the state: a labour process controlled by workers, responsible
to the whole of their class, rather than the government of another class.
FOOTNOTES
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p. 30. "dominated classes are expressed, inside state apparatuses,
as centres of resistance to bourgeois power or as movements which
divide state personnel or apparatuses" Poul ant zas 1977, p. 62.
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